

**Séverine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding***

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 311, ISBN 978-0-521-15601-1

**Séverine Autesserre, *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention***

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 329, ISBN 978-1-107-05210-9

*Reviewed by Alex Veit*

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With her two monographs on international humanitarian intervention, Séverine Autesserre has positioned herself as an authoritative voice in this aspect of IR. With her original constructivist approach, focussing on the ‘framing’ of problems of peace and war by international peacebuilders, she provides a welcome alternative to positivist approaches. While many studies of international intervention employ an institution-centred macro-perspective on cases of success or failure of international interventions, Autesserre has an eye for the daily occurring intricacies and contradictions of resolving complex emergencies. Moreover in much of the literature blame for a failure of peacebuilding is usually assigned to the warring parties or other peace ‘spoilers’. Politics in the Democratic Republic of Congo and other countries-at-war is treated as if international (and especially Western) forces were not an integral part of the political arena. Autesserre avoids neglecting the role of international actors in the politics of peacebuilding. In a refreshing change of perspective, she puts international factors contributing to failures at the centre of analysis.

*The Trouble with the Congo* is an extensively revised version of her PhD thesis, which meticulously confronts international diplomats and the United Nation’s mistaken recipes for peacebuilding with the realities of localised warfare along the Democratic Republic of Congo’s eastern border. Most Western analysts would agree with Autesserre that the wars and armed conflicts in that country, which have continued more or less unabated since 1997, have been caused by local, national and international factors. On the international level, neighbouring countries, among them Angola, Rwanda and Uganda, have used the Congo as a battleground. The governments of Rwanda and Uganda repeatedly fought their internal enemies, and sometimes each other, on Congolese soil. Both governments accused the Congo’s government of providing safe havens to rebel forces militarily expelled from their countries of origin, and even providing logistical and military support to their armed enemies.

Both countries' armies invaded the Congo in the late 1990s. Besides fighting the rebel groups, both countries' armies also enriched themselves through the illegal trade of gold, diamonds and other valuable natural resources in eastern Congo. This international problem has been gradually resolved with a series of peace treaties mediated by international actors. Since 2003, there has been no major non-invited military presence from neighbouring countries in the Congo, as has been confirmed by the world's largest UN blue helmet mission (MONUC, since 2010, MONUSCO). However, both countries were suspected of supporting a number of Congolese non-state armed groups with the aim of securing their economic and political influence in the resource-rich and insecure borderlands.

The second level, national antagonisms, was a problem initially caused by the disastrous politics of former dictator Joseph Mobutu. While his crumbling regime was toppled rapidly by the late Laurent Kabila in 1997, this favourite of a large African alliance was not able to unify the country. Within a year, the older Kabila's regime was challenged by a number of rebel movements that soon controlled the eastern and northern parts of the country. The conflict on this level was eventually settled by internationally mediated agreements, and international blue-helmet forces controlling the frontlines. The larger rebel groups sat down in an ineffective, but stable power-sharing government in 2003. Since 2006, President Joseph Kabila, son of the late Laurent Kabila, governs the country as elected leader. While his democratic credentials can be questioned, Kabila junior and his international backers have managed to keep the large and fragile state together for more than a decade. International interventionists labelled the situation since as 'peaceful', and accordingly engaged in 'post-conflict reconstruction'.

For quantitative academic literature, and for international mediators and diplomats, this counted as a success story. However, as Autesserre comments, the most important parts of the narrative have been overlooked. Along the Congo's eastern borders, violence and armed conflict continued unabated. Human rights violations on an outrageous level took place under the eyes of nearly 20,000 blue helmet soldiers and hundreds of diplomats, UN staff, and humanitarian workers. The civilian toll of fighting, looting and sexual violence easily surpassed the number of victims of other regional and national conflicts. Until today, dozens of non-state armed groups of Congolese and foreign origin roam the hills and forests of the Kivu provinces and bordering areas. The Congolese army, despite years of international support, hardly differs from those groups that seldom engage in military conflict, but rather exploit natural resources and the produce of local farming. "Even though the Congo is the stage of intense international peacebuilding efforts, and even though it recently experienced a transition from war to 'peace and democracy'," Autesserre asserts, "it continues to be plagued by the deadliest conflict since World War II."<sup>1</sup>

Why then have international peacebuilding efforts failed? Autesserre employs a constructivist analysis to answer this question. She argues that international diplomats turned a blind eye to the most pressing problem. This was the violence that revolved around local conflicts about land, natural resources, and political power. While international efforts concentrated on political deals on international and national levels, as well as national elections, they misinterpreted conflicts in the Kivu provinces as mere fallout and echo of international and national conflicts. Once neigh-

1 Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

bouring countries stopped stirring things up in the Congo, and a stable and legitimate government was installed in the capital Kinshasa, diplomats and peacebuilders reasoned, things would calm down. They have been misled, Autesserre argues, by a 'dominant peacebuilding culture', which emphasises a 'top-down approach' over 'bottom-up' peacebuilding.

The notion of a 'peacebuilding culture' is the author's central analytical angle. Autesserre deconstructs the international diplomatic discourse, and stresses that international and national macro-dimensions have been unduly emphasised. While she does not deny the importance of macro-conflicts, interventionist's denial of the political character of mass-violence during the Congo's 'postconflict transition' is criticised. Building on earlier work by historians and anthropologists on Western colonial and postcolonial imaginaries of the Congo, she asserts that international actors interpreted the violence as a quasi Hobbesian 'state of nature'. Large-scale violence was understood as mere apolitical 'trouble', neither worth the effort nor curable by humanitarian intervention. Based on this interpretation of Congolese reality interventionists employed the wrong tools. Their macro-approach focussed on national and international actors, who they held responsible to act upon local problems. The agency of local actors in the conflict zones was underestimated. Accordingly, international interventionists concentrated on what they probably could do best, namely organise national elections. The 'election fetish', Autesserre criticises, absorbed both the material as well as the mental resources of peacebuilders. Several hundred millions of US dollars were pumped into this complex operation in a country the size of Western Europe, populated mainly at its fringes and lacking any viable long-distance land transport infrastructure through dense rain forests. The UN's civilian apparatus, the diplomatic corps, and international military forces over years concentrated on this event in 2006. The supposedly locally limited violence in the east, meanwhile, created regular political crises also on national and international levels that put interventionists into constant emergency mode.

Interventionists' interpretation is confronted with Autesserre's own analysis of the conflict causes in eastern Congo. Based on interviews with international and national actors and experts, Autesserre depicts how motivations and interests of actors on different levels jointly led to escalated local warfare. Describing one local theatre of armed conflict after the other, Autesserre offers a differentiated representation of eastern Congo's violent trajectory, which pays central attention to local conflicts around land ownership, political representation and control of natural resources. She concludes that the agency of local actors was decisive, and should thus be subjected to international peacebuilding. Projects for local conflict-resolution have, however, been rare, underresourced, and sometimes outright rejected by international organisations. Asked why they ignored local conflicts, officials within the various UN agencies, Western development agencies and transnational NGOs put the responsibility on each other. Hardly anybody considered themselves suited to do the local job, and many probably were not. Instead, the importance of local conflict, even in cases when severe consequences for the national peace process were obvious, has been downplayed.

Autesserre's diagnosis of international ignorance about local conflict and violence in the Congo should be surprising to international policy-makers. After all, the last decade has seen a turn from traditional peacekeeping, geared to freeze interstate warfare, towards a peacebuilding approach that emphasises the 'responsibility

to protect' civilians from human rights violations. Surely, a focus on individuals as potential victims should involve a closer look at the localities where populations-at-risk reside. Moreover, international interventionists have written hundreds of papers and reports about 'learning lessons' and identifying 'best practices' after a series of peacekeeping failures in the 1990s from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Rwanda. Did all these efforts fail to improve the on-the-ground practices of peacebuilding?

To a large extent, Autesserre argues in her second monograph entitled *Peaceland*. In it, she expands her critique of a failure-prone peacebuilding culture, both analytically and geographically. That professional peacebuilders developed peculiar practices and habits is obvious to any visitor – and indeed also local populations – in conflict zones around the world. International four-wheel drives and fortified office buildings differentiate starkly with local poverty and destruction. Also the food, entertainment and sexual service industries that emerge once a peacebuilding mission arrives in a certain place, are obvious signs of the import of particular cultural practices. Insiders are also aware of the party culture of those often relatively young professionals employed by humanitarian NGOs and United Nations agencies. Given the hegemony of Westerners in this scene, some speak colloquially of a 'White bubble'.

*Peaceland* draws heavily on the author's Congo expertise and new empirical material, but is complemented by on-the-ground enquiries and insights into a number of post-conflict interventions such as in Nicaragua, Kosovo, East Timor and South Sudan. The global perspective certainly gives weight to the argument. Autesserre applies a sociological approach to the study of the 'everyday politics of international intervention', a focus on the inner workings of the peacebuilding machine. In seven chapters, she lays out the reasons for the 'one-size-fits-all' approaches that are applied around the globe, and which so often fall short of their aims. As in *The Trouble with the Congo*, she focuses heavily on the peculiar interpretation of conflict causes and potential remedies. Her arguments boil down to one important assertion: Peacebuilders 'fumble in the dark', as they know very little about local social, economic and political realities. Without specific local knowledge, it is very difficult to apply suitable instruments. The local consequences of peacebuilding projects are thus very often unintended, counterproductive, and create negative local responses. Why are peacebuilders' analytical capacities so weak?

Autesserre identifies intra-organisational logics as a main cause. International organisations and NGOs systematically prefer functional experts – for security sector reform, electoral organisation, or other instruments in the universal tool-kit of peacebuilding – over experts in the history and politics of host countries. Indeed, greater intimacy with local society is systematically discouraged by short-term projects and contracts. While understanding local realities takes years, as academic researchers are often aware of, peacebuilders are sent from one intervention theatre to the next in a matter of a few years or even only months. While macro-structures of conflict and national politics are often well understood by specialised political analysts in UN missions, micro-processes are systematically disregarded. Taking roots in local society, understanding local languages and cultural codes, and building relationships of trust with local actors that would allow for greater insights, are organisationally discouraged. 'Going native' may have a negative impact on the political neutrality of peacebuilders, but having no clue is no help either.

Furthermore, practical considerations as well as peacebuilding rituals separate peacebuilders from host societies, and thus produce ignorance of local reality. Security is understandably a top priority in violent environments. Fortification of offices, employment of security services, and security protocols regarding even mundane activities like walking in a neighbourhood or buying groceries, however, foster the isolation of peacebuilders. Their contacts into a host society are often restricted to local staff. Inequality between local employees and expatriate superiors, however, does not foster open relationships that would invite much needed local criticism of international projects. Peacebuilders' ritualised practices and narratives also widen the gap between themselves and local society. While peacebuilders often regard themselves as doing altruistic work in helping others, those others – local actors – are perceived as self-interested and potentially corrupt until proven otherwise. Ritual organisational requirements also foster separation. The long-standing humanitarian imperatives of 'neutrality' and 'impartiality' make peacebuilders avoid contact with local actors for fear of being perceived as biased. The need of peacebuilders to advertise their successes discourages local ownership of projects. As NGOs and IOs have to legitimise their projects to donors, expatriates spend valuable time writing superficial reports rather than implementing their projects. Ultimately, Autesserre argues, peacebuilders are accountable to donors and their organisations, rather than local society. They spend both their work-time as well as their leisure with fellow expatriates in offices and specialised, that is, securitised, exclusive restaurants and bars. Their social and analytical isolation results in often poor peacebuilding outcomes.

While this may sound like radical criticism, Autesserre is actually a believer in the values and appropriateness of peacebuilding. Her aim is to improve, rather than delegitimise the peace industry. In the conclusion of both books, she attempts to give some advice for enhancement. While improvement of conflict resolution activities are certainly worth another try, Autesserre's positivist perspective on the international capacity to build peace in developing countries sits peculiarly besides her constructivist methodologies. The belief in the social engineering of humanitarians and peacekeepers is unbroken, and with it comes the danger of analytical depoliticising of post-conflict situations, exactly the criticism Autesserre directs at the peace industry.

Already in the *Trouble with the Congo*, the constructivist approach sits uneasily beside positivist beliefs. The reader wonders, for example, why the author interpreted the Congo 'correctly', while so many professional peacebuilders as well as many Congolese got it 'wrong'. While Autesserre doubts the construction of reality by others, she expresses fewer qualms regarding her own analysis. Conflicts like those in the Congo are obviously extremely complex, and invite many different interpretations. None of which is necessarily wrong – but all of which evidently reduce complexity. In the Congo, a majority in the population and most local media accuse neighbouring Rwanda and the Rwandan-speaking minority of being responsible for most of the country's miseries. This perspective is certainly one-sided and may even lead to new conflicts, but it is an important local perspective. Nonetheless it is discarded by Autesserre, while at the same time local voices are highly commended for gaining a better understanding of local reality. Indeed, Autesserre builds her own analysis to a large extent on interviews with Congolese actors and observers, but obviously judged some opinions more plausible than others. Of

course, the critical examination of sources to arrive at plausible explanations is exactly the job of a political scientist that employs qualitative methods. However, we all produce only interpretation, not truth.

Commensurate with a belief in established peacebuilding techniques, Autesserre recommends the support for local peace initiatives and civil society organisations to peacebuilders. Doubtlessly, such projects are often worthy of external assistance. Yet in the turmoil of conflict, it is difficult to identify 'civil' initiatives that do not actually represent one side of a conflict or the other. The notion of a civil society independent of larger political camps is questionable also in peaceful societies. In countries undergoing civil wars, it often seems impossible. Indeed, to be recognised by international actors as genuine civil society organisations, a relatively large amount of economic and symbolic capital is necessary. Only a few Congolese dispose of such resources in the first place. Moreover, once adopted by external forces and provided with international resources, local actors run the risk of becoming dependent on external demands and orders, while serving as scapegoats once peacebuilding projects fail. More promising than reliance on particular local actors may be an emphasis on processes open to all local actors. Rather than relentlessly focussing on national elections, international peacebuilders in the Congo could have focussed on local elections. Thereby rebuilding the Congolese state from the bottom-up rather than from the top-down, this would also have been a chance to create local counterparts able to take part in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of international projects. To date, no local elections have taken place in the Congo, allowing the increasingly authoritarian national government a discretion in local affairs that is hardly suitable to the country's size and complexity.

Ultimately, and despite its constructivist approach, *Peaceland* also follows a managerial, positivist perspective. Again, local conflict appears resolvable by external actors, if only they listened more closely to and supported suitable local actors. The book would have profited from a closer engagement with the critical peacebuilding literature, which is less hopeful as it points to hardly resolvable dilemmas. Similar to the seeming paradox of creating peace by the use of arms and violence, peacebuilding is an illiberal activity that curtails local autonomy in the name of liberal peace and sovereign statehood. The idea of contemporary peacebuilding is an off-spring of the neoliberal moment after the Cold War. It is characterised by a notion of conflict *management*, which neglects and undermines the political character of conflictual processes. The peace industry's social engineering tool-kits, the proliferation of 'non-political' NGOs and international organisations in the humanitarian market-place, and structural inequality between resource-strong external actors and often largely voiceless local actors (apart from those carrying guns) encourage the depoliticising of these political processes. While providing an outstanding analysis of knowledge production and everyday practices, both books neglect such central structural dilemmas of contemporary peacebuilding.

A last criticism may be more a matter of style, but it has consequences also for the arguments of the two books. For the sake of argumentative straightforwardness Autesserre sacrifices most of what makes ethnographic description often so compelling and fascinating. Perhaps this is due to the endangered minority status of ethnographic approaches, which in political science and IR is often considered as mere story-telling. The result is an extra-precise, and extremely well referenced work, which however fails to catch the imagination. With it, the political essence of

war and peace easily gets lost to readers. It seems that peacebuilding is a mere managerial problem, that can be easily resolved by better analysis. Although in *Peaceland*, every chapter is opened by brief stories 'from the field', these descriptions always end abruptly before their full complexity is laid out. Rather than attempting to provide thick descriptions that portray the inherent contradictions of actual human encounters, the author is at pains to reference her arguments with recurring phrases like 'several contacts emphasised', 'interviewees provided multiple examples' or 'local populations, as well as scholarly and policy researches, have criticized' (*Peaceland*, pp. 91–2). One wonders how it can be that all of these contacts seem to confirm the author's arguments. In post-conflict situations, as many contradictory voices as there are parties to the conflict should be expected. As it does not adopt the rich inheritance of anthropological and historical story-telling, and with its ultimate ignorance of peacebuilder's depoliticising practices, *Peaceland* does not do 'for peacebuilding what [anthropologist] James Ferguson's *The Anti-Politics Machine* did for development studies', as Michael Barnett asserted in an advance appraisal. That said, both books are still invaluable cornerstones in the attempt better to understand contemporary activities of the global peace industry.

## **Thomas Davies, *NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society***

(London: Hurst, 2013), pp. 301, ISBN 978-1-84904-310-6

### *Reviewed by AJR Groom*

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Our knowledge of international organisations (IOs) is very unbalanced. Libraries have shelves of studies of the UN and other salient organisations such as NATO. The main International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) merit a number of serious studies such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), but studies of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) are few and far between when the much researched humanitarian organisations are left aside. Yet there are thousands of INGOs ranging from dingy offices staffed by a man and his dog to 30,000 Médecins Sans Frontières or the members of the International Cooperative Alliance which “unites a billion cooperators in ninety-one countries” (p. 1). They have an impact on the world. Without them the world would not go round in the same way – our lives would be different and, for the most part, the worse for their absence. And they have been there for some considerable time.

Dr Davies is well aware of the historical dimension. He seeks “to address this deficit and to provide a new history of transnational civil society through (i) revealing how INGOs have a far longer history than traditionally assumed; (ii) exploring the Eastern as well as the Western origins of INGOs; (iii) considering the history of a broader range of INGOs than previous studies; (iv) delineating how in contrast to conventional wisdom the history of INGOs has developed in a cyclical pattern; and (v) providing an explanatory framework for this pattern of evolution” (pp. 1–2). He succeeds to a considerable extent and we are thereby in his debt. He includes a bibliographical treasure trove and abundant references.

The book is divided into three parts. The first most important and interesting section concerns the 18th century until the outbreak of the Great War. Many introductory lectures on IO will be enhanced by its findings. The second period is 1914 to 1939 and largely covers well-tilled material. The same could be said of the third section from 1939 to the present day. However that would be to miss the cyclical nature within those periods of the rise and fall in numbers and relevance of INGOs. This is brought out in the chapters and reiterated as a major finding in the Conclusion.

Dr Davies is a self-confessed historian and not a political scientist or IR scholar. His method is that of a traditional, evolutionary chronology. He is clearly exceptionally well-read but the plethora of INGOs touched upon sometimes emphasises the trees rather than the wood. At times the text gets a little turgid, but it is good stuff all the same.

Going beyond the remit of the historian would enhance the value of this work. For example, what sort of voting procedures dominate in INGOs and how do Secretaries-General behave? What are the principal sources of finance, sometimes running into many millions? What is the range of the two-way relationship between Governments and INGOs? Who calls the shots in which particular fields? How 'democratic' are INGOs in their internal procedures? How do they recruit their officers? Despite these absences the reader will often say 'I did not know that ...'.

Dr Davies views INGOs and their work and mode of functioning with a sceptical eye although he could say more about the downside of the INGO world. But he sometimes underplays their influence, for example their breakthrough into the IGO world through their participation in global conferences with their ups and downs.

Whatever he might have done Dr Davies has opened an old world of INGOs to scrutiny and made a significant contribution to our understanding of the contemporary world to boot. He has done us a service and largely achieved his stated goals.

## **John Eatwell, Terry McKinley and Pascal Petit (eds.), *Challenges for Europe in the World, 2030***

(Farnham, Ashgate, 2014), pp. 408. ISBN 978-1-4724-1926-2

*Reviewed by Brigitte Young*

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This comprehensive and timely study assessing the challenges facing Europe in the World to 2030 is the result of an international collaborative research project that began in 2009 and was funded under the acronym AUGUR by the 7<sup>th</sup> Framework (FP7), DG Research of the European Commission. Assuming that the world is facing tectonic geopolitical power shifts from West to East and the South, the authors conclude that a major re-think of European economic organisation and strategy is needed in order to escape the consequences of the many challenges from low growth, rising unemployment to climate and demographic factors over the next twenty years. Focusing on economic parameters is all the more pertinent, since the financial crisis starting with the US subprime crisis in 2007 triggered staggering declines in global growth rates. The Eurozone soon faced an even more severe (and still continuing) banking and debt crisis from 2010, which was the result of dangerous, but largely neglected, interactions of financial macro-trends with market micro-trends. Some European political leaders suggested at the start of the subprime crisis that this was restricted to an American scenario stemming from neoliberal deregulation of finance and would not affect European financial markets. Since then a coordinated and co-operative response from European leaders is still largely wanting. But muddling through as a strategy to combat the global and regional challenges with their political risks is, as the authors convincingly demonstrate in their individual chapters, no longer an option, and may entail more costs than the challenge of choosing a new future. Alone, the success of the euro-sceptic parties in the European Parliamentary elections in May 2014 made the debate around the future challenges and policies for Europe in the world of 2030 all the more important. It is this challenge that the European research team has addressed in the nearly 400 pages to provide possible answers to the likely consequences of different European political governance strategies within the context of changing global governance structures for different policy areas.

The major research findings are presented in nine chapters each linked to eight themes based on the work of the research consortium consisting of seven European institutions. The book starts with an executive summary about Europe 2030 (Ch. 1), continues with global and European governance in a 2030 perspective (Ch. 2), macro-model scenarios and implications for European policy (Ch. 3), financial

markets and international regulation (Ch. 4), technology, productivity and trade (Ch. 5), energy environment and sustainable globalisation (Ch. 6), development, demography and migration (Ch. 7), well-being in Europe and in the World to 2030 (Ch.8), and the political economy of change at a time of structural crisis (Ch. 9). The chapters are easily accessible to both experts and non-experts providing detailed appendixes for more technical explanations. The novelty of the research findings is based on combining qualitative and quantitative methods which include a model of macro regions of the world economy (CAM), an institutional perspective, and insights from foresight studies. Coherence across the various policy areas is provided by a framework of different scenarios of global and European governance structures that seek to analyse under which scenario the challenges and possibilities for financial, economic, environmental and social policies can best be resolved. For this purpose, four assumptions on global governance have been matched with four assumptions on European governance. The explicit focus on governance indicates that the authors are critical of an economic paradigm which suggests that solutions to problems are best left to the market. Instead their framework of governance suggests a structuring role of 'public' intervention in the workings of the market.

Nevertheless, the authors take into account that a *reduced capacity of governments* to respond to challenges remains as one of the four possible assumptions of global governance. While the financial crisis has laid bare the inefficiencies of the market, it is unclear whether the retreat from multilateralism since the 1970s can be reversed. If reduced government is one trend with many likely negative outcomes in terms of world GDP, slower growth with higher income and social inequalities, another trend is the major role of China and the USA as two global super-players. The *US-China accommodation* could counter some of the adverse pressures arising from reduced government, but the global benefits would mostly accrue to the two players, and other countries would have to accept the parameters. Another trend which could provide some protection from the global liberalised markets is the development of *regionalisation* in North America, Europe, and also Asia. Analysing the results of concerted regional cooperation in terms of trade and investment can promote economic growth within each region, but can do little to resolve issues such as climate change or development problems in low income countries. Nor is regionalism possible across the globe since favourable conditions are often missing outside Europe, North America, and Asia. The most advantageous global environment to bridge the gap between high-income regions, emerging markets and low-income countries is a framework of *multipolar cooperation*. The gains from such collaboration are high, but as the study points out, to implement such policies in practice two tigers – global financial markets and nationalistic politics – have to be tamed to facilitate collaboration at the global level.

If the global environment ranging from scenarios of reduced government, US-China accommodation, regionalisation, and multi-polar collaboration is the context in which Europe has to cope with the challenges ahead, then the authors suggest that there are also four possible assumptions for European governance structures to 2030 which are seen either as a constraint or facilitator for resolving the crises facing Europe. One trend is described as *muddling through*, but there is also the possibility of a Eurozone break-up, the construction of a multi-speed Europe, and a final scenario towards the creation of a federal Europe. Muddling through would mean that the long-term problems of government debt, financial instability, the

danger of deflation, and unemployment remain unresolved. Small *ad hoc* adjustments are only made to maintain the Eurozone. If there is another shock due to financial problems or as a result of Euro-sceptic parties winning national elections, there is the possibility of a *Eurozone break-up* with the re-introduction of national currencies. However, such a Eurozone break-up would not only have devastating long-term consequences even for southern debtor nations, it would also mean further economic and financial instability fuelling currency speculation across Europe. Last but not least, it would undermine the existing institutional structures of the European Union. A more positive assumption is seen by the authors in a *multi-speed Europe* with different currency areas such as has been proposed for a Northern Euro and Southern Euro zone. Whether the EU can continue to play a central role in policies to support convergence within Europe and cooperation with neighbours, as the authors seem to maintain, is an open question. It is debatable whether the EU can in such a multi-speed Europe respond effectively to the challenges. A final hypothesis envisages a *Federal Europe* with its own budget and a European Treasury which would be able to manage common bond issuance to fund federal deficits and debts of member states. These aspects could play an important role in reducing the income differences between northern and southern member states of the European Union.

Situating the differing European governance scenarios within the global contexts, the authors conclude that the future of the European economy is dependent both on the politics made within Europe and on the future of global economic performance. However, irrespective of the global scenarios, the studies outlined in the chapters provide evidence that the present strategy of muddling through would mean the worst possible outcome for a European growth strategy over the next 20 years. The best strategy would be a movement towards a federal Europe with its own federal budget. This would mean that fiscal policy would no longer be the terrain of member-states. Moving fiscal policy to the European Union is central to further deepening of European integration. Needless to say, such a strategy would be fraught with great political difficulties, since it would involve giving up some sovereignty at the nation-state level. At the same time, such loss of sovereignty could also expand the political space for European leaders to negotiate and navigate within the global context to achieve a more prosperous Europe.

This excellent book will provide important and novel insights for students of global and European governance, scholars pursuing European integration studies and analysing the increasing gap between elites and the general public, scholars and policy makers focusing on the challenges ahead in such fields as financial regulation and macro-economic stability, demography, employment and migration, energy needs and climate change, health, social inclusion and income inequality. But, as the authors rightly point out, the danger confronting any research is that the issues selected are likely to be dominated by the circumstances of the financial crisis that began in 2007. Nobody could foresee that in 2014 the headlines would no longer be the financial and economic crises, but the eruption of military conflicts in the Ukraine and also in Syria, Libya, Iraq and in some North African states. Some of these conflicts such as the Ukrainian are not just a danger to the European cross-border economic and financial flows, it endangers the entire post-1989 framework of cooperation between the West and Russia. The eruption of military conflict demonstrates further that the much celebrated European peace project achieved after two murderous world wars in the 20<sup>th</sup> century cannot be taken for granted. For any future

project analysing the challenges ahead surely military conflicts and security issues have to be integrated into such large scale studies, since they have economic and financial repercussions as the sanctions against Russia, and vice versa, presently so painfully demonstrate.

## **Giovanni Finizio and Ernesto Gallo (eds.), *Democracy at the United Nations. UN Reform in the Age of Globalisation***

(Brussels: Peter Lang Edition, 2013), pp. 359, ISBN 978-90-5201-894-2

*Reviewed by Kirsten Haack*

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At a time when supranationalism has been cast into doubt following the financial crisis of the Eurozone, Finizio's and Gallo's volume is a breath of fresh air to remind us that ideas of integration and global politics continue to be of relevance. This book is the first in a new series on federalism by the Centre for Studies on Federalism at the University of Turin. Finizio and Gallo bring together a range of writers supportive of the idea of world federalism, embracing the promise of a reformed United Nations while cognisant of the fact that it has been discredited by past actions of its key members. The men writing in this volume all share the conviction that the future of international relations is cosmopolitan and federal, and that the UN's problems can be overcome to bring about a more global future.

As an edited volume this book achieves a surprising degree of coherence between the various contributions as every chapter builds on another to discuss the question why UN reform is needed (part I) and how a stronger UN can be achieved through enhanced representation of peoples (part II) and reform of the Security Council (part III). Finizio and Gallo challenge the authors to address the crisis of legitimacy and effectiveness that the UN faces, highlighting the impact of globalisation on policy-making, changing power structures and declining hegemony. They note that at present international organisations are too weak and too incoherent to address emerging issues of human security. While regionalism has been one answer to the problem, a trend that several of the authors writing here incorporate into their reform proposals, the focus here is on enabling the UN to play a leading role in global governance in the future. This is to be achieved through world federalism, not world government. Even if the long-term goal could be world government, the authors insist that states (should) continue to exist for the time being. The contributors to this volume thus conceptualise their reform proposals broadly around the institutional framework of cosmopolitan democracy, restated here by Archibugi. Although the volume betrays a considerable degree of unease with the state, the authors are never fully able to let go of state-level affairs or indeed their Western perspective. Thus, there are a number of unresolved tensions as to the meaning and function of each level in a global federal system that permeate the authors' proposals.

In part the continuing focus on state-level politics originates from the particular starting point for this volume, which is dissatisfaction with the use and abuse of the

UN by the United States. This critique may not be new, however this volume reacts to a particular event – the 2003 invasion of Iraq – and thus provides a peculiar reflection of a specific time: While the book was published in 2013, the individual contributions to it were clearly written sometime in 2006 or 2007. In this world US president Obama had just been elected and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was new to his role, while elsewhere New Labour was still in government in the UK. Only Gallo refers to the global financial crisis, which has since raised questions about the degree of European integration and the Euro's challenger role to the dollar. The Arab Spring, the ensuing conflicts in Libya and Syria, and with it the Russian-Chinese veto do not feature. Instead, with Iraq fresh in their memories, the contributors to this volume are perhaps too wedded to a particular incident, not clarifying whether the events of 2003 are symptomatic of a flawed 70 year old system and therefore requiring urgent change or relatively unique to recent times.

Split into three sections, Part I deals with the question of how world politics is changing and why reform is needed. Telò asks whether the European Union could enhance global democracy and act as a model for regionalism. He notes its potential but highlights that regional integration has to move beyond its current focus on economic and trade integration to include broader social and political concerns. Levi and Amin then utilise Marxist frameworks to analyse the current need for a reformed UN. Levi notes that globalisation, as a distinct phase in the mode of production, has led to a mismatch between global markets and state-bound politics that fundamentally decrease the legitimacy of politics. Unusually, Levi is positive that sovereignty is not outdated but argues that it needs to be transferred to the UN to support world federalism. Similarly, despite his belief that capitalism is obsolete and that the UN is its key achievement, Amin is convinced that the UN needs to be rescued and returned to its original purpose, which US and Western *inaction* has undermined. Adding to concerns about regionalism, multilateralism, globalisation and capitalism, Baratta provides a historic overview over world federalist thought. His concerns are both theoretical and empirical: On the one hand, Baratta notes the absence of a crisis sufficiently destabilising to bring about a new global order in the form of world federalism; on the other hand, in the absence of world government, the United States has taken over the role of a world government. Baratta calls for more concerted people's activism to achieve world federalism. Finally, Polsi provides an historic overview over UN reforms, highlighting their bureaucratic nature and the continued US domination in bringing about or preventing reforms.

Parts II and III include both analyses of the contexts in which the UN and especially the Security Council operate, with only a few conceptual proposals for reform. Part II turns to the 'quest for people's representation at the United Nations', starting with a restatement of cosmopolitan democracy by Archibugi. Archibugi emphasises that the introduction of cosmopolitan democracy needs to have strong grassroots elements - democracy needs to grow from the inside and should not be imposed from the outside. As such democracy between states should be enhanced irrespective of their internal make up. Archibugi stresses that the rule of law is essential to bringing about this grassroots democratisation, yet an enhanced ICC appears to be in the first instance relevant to US actions, not to those of authoritarian states. Strauss asks how best to initiate a global parliament at the heart of world federalism, drawing on the EU. This Global Parliamentary Assembly would function as a lateral and vertical connection between the international system and citizens, and between various

international organisations in order to overcome the current lack of a centre of gravity in the international system. Finally, Marchetti's proposal seeks to stretch the argument by considering the introduction of a world government through cosmo-federalism, yet his framework does appear substantially to change Archibugi's cosmopolitan democracy.

In part III the authors turn to the question of how the Security Council can be strengthened and democratised, thus offering either an alternative or a medium-term solution to the world federalist approaches outlined in part II. Reforming the Security Council makes it essential, according to the authors, to address US hegemony and its disdain for international law. The suggestions for reform are detailed and move beyond the manifold existing proposals to merely expand membership. However, by focussing so determinedly on the continued existence of the Security Council, the authors acknowledge that world federalism continues to be built on states and not any time soon on world government or a cosmopolitan world community. As several authors insist that world federalism (or indeed world government) is best brought about in a step-by-step manner, the reform of the Security Council can only be seen as an interim measure. How then should the Security Council be reformed for greater strength and democracy? Hampson argues that while contemporary security issues are less lethal and are overall decreasing, conflict management capabilities need to be diversified and institutions strengthened; most importantly, the burden of conflict management needs to be increasingly spread regionally. Schwartzberg provides one of only three conceptual proposals in this volume and proposes a 'radical' approach of weighted voting based on flexible regions to ensure that reform does not replicate previous attempts merely to expand access for regional great Powers, but that it enhances the welfare of the world as a whole. To achieve this, Schwartzberg argues that regional membership could be overlapping and multiple, and regions should be based on size and contributions. Thus, the US, China, India and Japan could be single nation regions, while other states make up eight multinational regions, who would serve in overlapping two-year terms based on whichever method of appointment chosen by the region. Schwartzberg insists that accountability must be built into this framework, for example by the requirement of regional, not state representation, and the possibility of recall. Interestingly, Schwartzberg provides a sample charter amendment to illustrate required changes. Köchler, Bargiacchi and Finizio also see regions as central to a reformed Security Council, yet focus more explicitly on the veto and its use. Köchler insists that unanimity should be transformed into a super-majority, allowing for decisions to be taken without certain members blocking it, while Bargiacchi demands that the use of the veto should require justification.

Conceptually, the authors' attempts to develop the case for world federalism suffers from their focus on the US (and its relationship with the UN and international law) as a reformed UN is primarily envisaged to rein in US hegemony and, more generally, Western power. Neither China nor Russia, whose annexation of Crimea was similarly an attempt to (re)assert its power by flouting international law, are considered here. Thus, world federalism becomes a means to a specific end, rather than emanating from a genuine concern for cosmopolitan relationships and institutions:

...the most important innovation that the institution of World Parliament will bring will be that the West shall abandon its pretension (which has so far been considered as a natural fact) to govern the world to its own advantage. That will be the inevitable consequence of conferring one vote to each citizen. So, in world affairs, the

voting rights of Indian citizens would weigh more than twice that of European Union citizens and almost four times more that of United States citizens. Therefore the Europeans and Americans will have to admit that they are a minority when compared with two billion and a half Indian and Chinese citizens (Levi, p. 73).

What Levi betrays here is that basic democratic rules are opportunely used against the West to rein in US hyperpower, yet ignoring that the majority of bicameral systems use their chambers precisely to balance geographic, ethnic or other differences. This follows the understanding that the principle of one-person-one-vote does not lead to results independent of social, political or ethnic groupings that in themselves can lead to various, shifting forms of inequality between them. Even if world government is acknowledged as the final, long-term goal, the authors here do recognise that states continue to exist but are unable to clarify why billions of Indians and Chinese are of greater value than citizens of Andorra or Tonga, who are also nation-states with shared histories, cultures and political values. It is this preoccupation with (population) numbers that highlights a fundamental gap in the project of political cosmopolitanism and world federalism, namely, the lack of a global theory of representation. The authors of this volume, like other cosmopolitan writers, are too concerned with institutions and give little consideration as to how sub-state levels (e.g. Texas and Uttar Pradesh) and citizens of different states should relate to one another, or how different interests (culturally, socially, politically, ideologically) can be balanced to achieve a world polity for the benefit of *all*. Gallo raises the strong focus of cosmopolitan writers on institutions as concern, yet neither he nor Köchler, who seeks to provide a 'philosophical approach' of some sort, develop these fundamental ideas of political relationships further. Ultimately then, this volume is concerned with UN reform – more tinkering with the bodies of the UN to improve representation, democracy and legitimacy – but world federalism it is not.

## **Maria Găinar, *Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne. Les Neuf et la coopération politique européenne, 1973–1980***

(Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2012), pp. 642, ISBN 978-90-5201-845-4

*Reviewed by Laurent Warlouzet*

University of Artois

This book stems from a Ph.D. defended in 2011 at Strasbourg University and supervised by Prof. Marie-Thérèse Bitsch. Its quick publication is welcome as it deals with an important topic: the first decade of European Political Cooperation (EPC). The EPC emerged from the so-called ‘Davignon report’ of 1970. Written by the Belgian diplomat, and later prominent European commissioner Etienne Davignon, it advocated the regular meeting of Foreign Affairs ministers (every semester) and of their deputies, the director of political affairs of the Foreign Affairs ministry (every three months) to discuss foreign affairs issues. The meetings would have to be embedded within the EEC system, albeit with a limited role for the Commission, in order to reconcile the intergovernmental vision of France (reminiscent of the Plan Fouchet) and the (slightly) more supranational vision of some of its partners. In fact, Georges-Henri Soutou has demonstrated the continuity between de Gaulle and Pompidou in terms of European political cooperation, even if the latter had a less confrontational style<sup>1</sup>. The European Political Cooperation began in 1970 but Maria Găinar’s book concentrates on the 1973–1980 period, probably because the first years had already been studied by Möckli’s book on Brandt, Heath and Pompidou, and by a couple of articles<sup>2</sup>. The unity of the period is justified by the size of the Community, a Europe of nine member-states, which included now the United Kingdom, the most important diplomatic Power in Europe alongside France, one neutral country (Ireland), and Denmark. As the author underlines, this enlargement was both an opportunity, in terms of influence on the world arena, and a challenge with regard to the ability of European diplomats to find a common ground.

Maria Găinar’s book rests overwhelmingly on the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s archives, supplemented by a couple of private papers from the European

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1 Georges-Henri Soutou, “Les présidents Charles de Gaulle et Georges Pompidou et les débuts de la coopération politique européenne : du Plan Fouchet au Plan Fouchet light”, in *Relations internationales* 2009/4 (n° 140), pp. 3–17.

2 Daniel Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity*, London, New York, IB Tauris, 2009, p. 476; Wilfried Loth, ‘European political co-operation and European security in the policies of Willy Brandt and Georges Pompidou’, in Jan Van Der Harst (ed.), *Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community’s Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969–1975*, (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2007), pp. 21–34; Georges-Henri Soutou, *op. cit.*; see also the references to Aurélie Gfeller and Angela Romano’s books thereafter.

archives, in particular those of Emile Noël (who was the all-powerful secretary-general of the Commission) and by the French Presidential archives of Georges Pompidou (1969–74). The archives of the Political Commission of the European Parliament have been used but this institution was largely toothless. The interviews of two Belgian and two French former actors, and the use of published material from American (up to 1976) and British (up to 1975) archives helped to complete the inquiry. As a result, the book deals as much with the French vision of the EPC, rather than with Europe and the EPC. A European vision is sometimes more visible, for example on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). This results in a very dense and long book (580 pages), albeit always clear. It is supplemented by an index, a chronology and useful lists of the EPC meetings' agendas and declarations.

The book is divided in two parts. The first deals with the 1973–1976 period, after a first chapter recollecting the beginnings of the EPC (1969–73). The first theme is the 'Year of Europe' proposal of Kissinger, a topic now thoroughly examined in the literature as it is linked to the Copenhagen Declaration of 1973 on a 'European Identity'<sup>3</sup>. Then the two most important issues are tackled, the Middle East and the CSCE. Their results in terms of EPC are sharply contrasting. On the one hand, the failure of the Europeans to agree on the Middle East was total. The oil shock led to an uncoordinated response among the Nine. The proposal to establish an euro-arab dialogue thereafter floundered into empty declarations and grandiose but ineffective meetings. The particular position of France, who was desperate to establish a specific dialogue with the Arabs independently from the United States, was a major source of disruption. Conversely, the Nine were much more united on the CSCE issue. Maria Găinar's book confirms Angela Romano's earlier study<sup>4</sup> which had underlined how the Commission managed to play a decisive role not only in the economic debates, but also to facilitate the development of common positions among the Nine. Aldo Moro signed the final Act at Helsinki in 1975 both as Italian Prime Minister, and as chairman of the EEC Council of Ministers, which ensured that the EEC was part of the deal. As Maria Găinar underlines however, quoting Jacques Andréani, the debates were theoretical and ideological, without much immediate material consequences (p. 304). The author concludes this chapter by a useful examination of the Eurobarometer polls which show a constant support of the population in favour of an active European foreign policy. A last chapter deals with the Cyprus crisis of 1974 (triggered by the Turkish military response). An embryo of common position quickly vanished. In the end, as in the Middle East issue, the European influence on this question was likewise limited.

The second part of the book tackles a more difficult period for EPC as East-West tensions resumed with what is sometimes called the 'Second Cold War', starting with the euromissiles crisis which unfolded in 1977. In this tense international context, it was more difficult for Europeans to exist alongside the two super Powers. This is obvious in the chapter devoted to the follow-up of the CSCE conference, with a dwindling European influence, and in the chapter on the dramatic events of 1979, the Iran crisis and the Afghanistan war. Under intense pressure from the Americans,

3 Aurelie Gfeller, *Building a European Identity: France, the United States, and the Oil Shock* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012).

4 Angela Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente. How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE* (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2009).

the Nine agreed half-heartedly to a couple of common positions, only to let their divergence resume in their implementation. However, some progress was noticeable. To begin with, even if the EEC remained toothless in the Middle East issues, its positions were gradually becoming closer. Even Germany agreed to support the Palestinian right to autodetermination. This led to a common declaration in 1980. The issue of South Africa loomed large as the *Apartheid* regime became more radical in the mid-1970s. Maria Găinar showed that, despite a unity in the discourse condemning South Africa, there was still division among the Nine in the votes. France, Germany and the United Kingdom appeared as more reluctant to take concrete steps, probably because of commercial interests and also because South Africa was a key actor in the resolution of the Rhodesian and Namibian issues. Nevertheless, the Nine agreed on a 'Code of Conduct' in 1977, based on economic sanctions. This is an important landmark as it is the first concrete step taken. It was a non-binding text which required a lot of persuasion from national governments on their companies working with South-Africa (whose number ranged from 300 in the United Kingdom to zero in Ireland and Luxembourg).

Logically, the assessment of the EPC in the conclusion is mixed. On the one hand, the Nine issued 77 declarations, including some on tricky topics like Israel. A 'community of work' was created among diplomats who learned to work together on a regular basis. The institutional framework gradually improved: a 'crisis procedure' was established after the 1973–74 events, the role of the Commission increased and the creation of the European Council raised the profile of the EPC. The Nine agreed on a code of conduct against South Africa. Most of all, the Community played an important role during the CSCE negotiations. On the other hand, the sharp divisions between the Nine limited the EPC to a 'declaratory diplomacy'. Divisions concerned not only the relationship with the United States, or the heritage of colonial ties, but also the influence of commercial interest and the mere meaning of a common European diplomacy. For former colonial Powers with an assertive world vision, it did not mean the same as for countries who had lost the Second World War, for small countries with no responsibilities outside Europe, and for neutral countries. As a result, there was no agreement on the most salient and concrete issues. After 1980, the Falklands war of 1982 demonstrated the difficulties of the (then) ten members of the EEC to agree even on what could appear as a secondary issue for many European countries. The EPC was officially inserted in the EEC framework in the Single Act of 1986 but has remained for decades a 'declaratory diplomacy'.

## **Atanas Gotchev, Conflict: Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy**

(in Bulgarian Атанас Гочев, *Конфликтът – ранно сигнализиране и превантивна дипломация*)

(Sofia: Albatross Publishers, 2012), pp. 475, ISBN 978-954-751-106-4 (pbk)

*Reviewed by Ivan Dinev Ivanov*

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The recent conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, Iraq, Syria, Iran and Libya have confirmed once again that international crises are not going to disappear in the near future. In fact, we are witnessing once again a surge of inter- and intra-state conflicts and their victims, whereas both national governments and the international community lack effective mechanisms to predict and possibly prevent the occurrence of such tragic events. In his 2012 volume *Conflict: Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy*, Atanas Gotchev, a Professor of International Relations at the University of National and World Economy in Sofia, Bulgaria, asks an essential question raised by scholars of conflict studies – is it possible to identify and avert crisis situations prior to their occurrence in order to eliminate major threats for national and international security? The answer offered in *Conflict* is that the *ex-post facto* analysis of every crisis showed multiple signals pointing to its possible occurrence but, generally speaking, individuals and institutions were inept at identifying the sources of instability and unable to implement adequate action plans to respond to crisis situations.

The purpose of this volume is to serve as a handbook for students of international conflict and practitioners working in the field to capture crisis signals with the help of early warning (EW) systems and implement adequate and timely measures to avert such crises and conflicts. The book is a very useful entry point to the study of international conflicts and crises. It takes the form of a reference work that surveys the literature on international crises at two different levels. Firstly, it surveys key definitional concepts in the literature (such as state failure, early warning, conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, political crises, and others). Secondly, the volume presents a comprehensive overview of several different generations of models developed by political scientists that explain and predict conflict and crisis behaviour. These include static and dynamic models of conflict analysis, as well as advanced methods for mapping, monitoring and early warning of emerging international conflicts. The author argues that, if properly designed and implemented, early warning models can be effective mechanisms to avoid potential crises and future conflicts.

The state and its internal makeup are the centrepiece of Gotchev's work. *Conflict* undertakes an interdisciplinary approach that incorporates multiple perspectives including security and developmental ones. The author correctly notes that the literature on the topic is fragmented across different social science disciplines and

political science sub-fields, which has consequently contributed to a growing gap between theory and practice with regard to early warning and preventive diplomacy (pp. 57–58). He highlights that, by and large, the literature attributes state failure to domestic or external variables related to political, institutional, administrative, economic, and other processes. On an analytical level Gotchev discusses how state failure can be operationalised as dichotomous (e.g. failed, *vis-à-vis* non-failed states) and as a continuum (fragile, failing, and failed states). Whereas attributive definitions link state failure to processes during which the state becomes unable to provide basic social, economic, legal, political, and other services to its population, chronological definitions emphasise state failure as an outcome with major external, internal and mixed implications (p. 63). The author advocates a tri-dimensional approach that looks into effectiveness, power and legitimacy as key ingredients of state failure and discusses the need for an overarching typology that explains how traditional concepts like developing countries and countries in transition relate to weak, failing (or failed) and collapsed states.

Prof. Gotchev defines conflict prevention as an activity (engagement) that deals with predicting and neutralising conflicts, where neutralisation includes both practical and normative issues. He identifies several core aspects of preventive diplomacy (PD) that include various activities; the timing of intervention; and the most appropriate action necessary in a specific conflictual situation (pp. 95–97). Furthermore, conflict prevention rests on early warning and early action (or reaction), the latter includes humanitarian, civil, military, and political intervention. Consequently, PD relies on non-governmental organisations (NGOs), individual states, and international organisations to neutralise conflicts. The author reminds us about an interesting puzzle: despite the fact the international community prefers to react to international crises through IOs and individual states, NGOs are often better equipped to deal with it.

*Conflict* also suggests a narrow and broad definition of early warning – the narrow one consists of collection of data to signal a disaster whereas the broad one includes recommendations on how to influence government policies and is, therefore, prescriptive in its character. The book surveys in great length techniques for EW data collection that include field observation, monitoring of qualitative and quantitative indicators and analysis based on pre-established models (such as the *Minorities at Risk* project, GEDs, PANDA, and other networks) many of which are created and maintained by leading NGOs, US and European universities, and other academic and educational institutions. The author carefully analyses the strengths and weaknesses of various EW methods and lists essential criteria for a good EW system.

Further, *Conflict* examines the meaning of another multi-dimensional term – political crisis – whose accurate understanding can facilitate an effective response by various actors. Gotchev warns his readers that, while crises are mostly destructive, they can also be constructive or creative; he reminds us of their cyclical structure that includes several common distinctive elements – shrinkage, depression, and expansion that reaches a peak (pp. 174–76).

The second part of the volume compares several different generations of models for conflict analysis. Static models include a variety of causal variables operating on a micro- and macro-level such as biological, societal, behavioural and systemic sources of international conflict. Special attention is paid to the Mitchell-Galtung model according to which any conflict or dispute consists of three inter-related

structural components – (1) situation, (2) behaviour and, (3) attitudes and perceptions (p. 243).

Unlike static models which assume a linear relationship between the cause and the effect variables, Gotchev reminds us that dynamic models assume that conflicts are cyclical in character and consist of several distinctive stages. Therefore, correct identification of these stages is a key to designing and implementing effective early warning and conflict prevention policies. By comparing dynamic models introduced by Lincoln Bloomfield, the US Institute for Peace and the UN System Staff College in Chapters eight and nine, the author concludes that international conflicts follow a common pattern of escalation, stalemate, de-escalation and, therefore, identifying the moment when a crisis escalates is essential in designing adequate strategies and implementing short- and long-term policies of de-escalation. This pattern is additionally illustrated through the circular model of the UN System Staff College. More importantly, the process of de-escalation can be most difficult and cumbersome to manage due to linkage among multiple conflicts and other exogenous factors such as the global economy (pp. 305–6).

Prof Gotchev also warns his readers that understanding the anatomy of conflict alone is not sufficient for designing an adequate ER system and suggests a more detailed analysis of political institutions as described by Vallings Moreno-Torres, as well as elections and regime change (included in a model by the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of Foreign Affairs in Clingendael) as predictors for failed or fragile states. The author's key argument here is that a connection exists between profile, participants and causes of conflict. He also points to the triad – background conditions, accelerators and triggers introduced by Ted Gurr and Barbara Harf – in the process of mapping out international conflicts for EW.

Consequently, in the last two chapters Professor Gotchev offers to his readers several models that focus on institutional variables such as state instability, political fragility, divisive forces and domestic institutions as key predictor for state failure. Based on his earlier work in several different countries, he explains how to design and rank various EW indicators for state failure thus generating composite indexes (e.g. index for social development and security) as well as an aggregate instability index combining several composite indices measuring social development and security, economic development, human and personal security, and the demographic dynamics. Furthermore, the author introduces a novel 'analytical prism' that includes collecting data from mass media and coding key EW predictors along a cooperation-conflict continuum. In order to make sure that the approach is comprehensive in character, he suggests several different clusters of variables – political and financial stability, income level, system of social security, employment, inter-ethnic stability, personal safety and others.

Finally, Prof. Gotchev touches upon some of the constraints facing EW models in the concluding chapter. He correctly points out that the bureaucratic culture of domestic institutions, the administration's limited expertise coupled with ruling elites' inability to understand and process information, as well as insufficient coordination and coherence among those who collect relevant information all constrain to EW models' ability to influence policy decisions. To this end, he recommends additional training and education of experts and decision-makers combined with constant improvement of the analytical methods and techniques in order to increase these models' impact and avert future crises.

Despite its comprehensive character, *Conflict* has several notable weaknesses. First, some of the earlier discussion on conflict-related concepts (especially the discussion on international crises in chapter six) is quite lengthy and does not necessarily help the reader better to grasp conflicts' anatomy. Alternatively, when discussing the mapping of conflicts and the development of EW systems, the author could have incorporated more anecdotal examples and practical policy recommendations. Second, whereas Prof. Gotchev surveys a vast literature on the topic, perhaps he needs to do a better job in explaining how this literature evolved from earlier and underdeveloped models to more sophisticated dynamic models introduced in the last two decades. Third, in order to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of EW theoretical models, the author could have spent more time in explaining how and under what conditions contending models apply to various historical and contemporary cases.

Along the same logic, drawing on Juan Linz's typology of democratic, non-democratic and hybrid regimes, it would be interesting if the author could consider a separate study of how EW systems can influence the decision-making process in various (democratic, non-democratic and hybrid) regimes and explain what (if any) relationship exists between these regime types and direct or indirect crisis outcomes. Similarly, if Prof. Gotchev chooses to publish a new edition or a separate study, we would recommend him to consider adding a comparative analysis of several different countries where such EW systems were developed – in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the countries of former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union), as well as the Middle East (e.g. Jordan). Such a study would render new insights with important theoretical and policy implications.

To sum up, *Conflict: Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy* is an interdisciplinary work that draws theoretical and empirical knowledge from the sub-fields of international relations, comparative studies, public policy, and conflict studies. It offers a comprehensive approach that involves applying a novel typology to studying the early warning and prevention of international conflicts, thus making it a valuable addition to the literature on the topic available to students and policy makers in Bulgaria. However, we do believe that the book has potential for a larger impact on the epistemic community and, therefore, would encourage the author to consider a similar edition in English that would be accessible to a broader audience working on the prevention of similar conflicts in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Central and South America and other parts of the world.

## **Atanas Gotchev, Атанас Гочев, Конфликтът: Теории и Подходи за Разрешаване**

(Sofia: Albatross Publishers, 2011), 323 pp., ISBN 978-954-751-100-2 pbk (in Bulgarian)  
Conflict: Theories and Approaches Towards Conflict Resolution (Reviewer's translation)

*Reviewed by Lyubov Grigorova Mincheva*  
University of Sofia

In a number of publications at the turn of the century analysts predicted the decline of inter-state conflict worldwide and an increase of settlements in intra-state group conflicts. These optimistic predictions have been made in the light of the 1990s post-Cold War conflict trends worldwide. They promised more peace and less conflict in the next decade. In a matter of months, however, with the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the issue of conflict has been brought back on to the international agenda – this time calling attention to new type of conflicts taking place in a new type of international setting. Indeed, for more than a decade the world has witnessed a resurgence of conflict, especially in particular world regions, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, North Africa and the Middle East. With Gotchev's book to hand scholars can take another chance to think about the various causes of conflict, analyse conflicts' complicated nature and understand the difficulty in reaching a conflict settlement, once violence has passed an irreversible point of escalation.

Gotchev's volume, *Conflict: Theories and Approaches Towards Conflict Resolution*, is an interdisciplinary study of theories of conflict analysis and approaches to conflict management. The author – a long time contributor to the United Nations Development Programme and particularly to its Early Warning Regional and Country Reports – is an experienced practitioner with expertise in the politics of the Western Balkans, the Middle East, the once autonomous republic of Crimea, and other regions across the Russian federation. He believes that effective conflict diplomacy and prevention rests on sound analysis of conflict theory. Knowledge in this field is especially important nowadays given the multiplying challenges facing conflict experts. Why do conflicts multiply globally? Alternative approaches compete to answer this question. Some analysts would point to the so-called 'new wars' and 'failed states' as reasons which give rise to transborder crime and terrorism. Others would single out the effects of modernisation and globalisation as the main reason, and in particular the increasing economic and ecological inequality in world politics. Gotchev's study aims to enrich our understanding of conflict resources and improve our approaches to conflict management. This study is simultaneously academic as well as a policy oriented publication.

What is conflict? An excellent handbook as it is the volume begins by reviewing the scholarship on social and international conflict (Kriesberg, p. 11; Holsti, p. 19), including types of conflicts and conflict typology (Holsti, p. 22). The theoretical discussion further reviews different perspectives on the nature of conflict, including the biological, behavioural, cognitive, social learning, class, as well as the liberal-realist perspective. The author discusses the Anglo-American scholarship on conflict; then he turns to the Slavic scholarly tradition, introducing Bulgarian and Russian scholars, such as Hristo Popov, Dimiter Dimitrov, Grishina, Vigotskyi (pp. 44-45). Gotchev further introduces theories of conflict resolution. Different cultural perspectives on conflict resolution are included. Dimitrov, Kibanov, Antzipov and Shipilov, Kozyirev, Kubratov who represent the Slavic tradition (p. 50), and Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, Wallensteen among others represent the Anglo-American scholarly tradition (p. 50). Drawing on this rich scholarship in the fields of conflict analysis and conflict resolution Atanas Gotchev argues that little has yet been published on the linkages between the two bodies of literature (p. 50). To this ambitious aim the author would dedicate the rest of his research. It is organised as follows: a large portion of the book reviews and discusses the three branches of theories in conflict analysis. The author refers to them as (a) theories explaining conflict with “inherent traits in human nature”, (b) theories explaining conflict with “outer factors”, such as the social and political, (c) and “theories of interaction”, explaining conflict with factors drawn from the above two analytical traditions (p. 51). The author next examines the emergence, evolution, consolidation and transformation of theories in conflict management. Finally, he traces linkages between theories of conflict analysis and theories of conflict resolution.

What is striking in Gotchev’s analysis is his deep interest in psychological theories of aggression and violence. At first glance the author – himself a political scientist – places an unnecessarily heavy burden on his own shoulders. His research agenda is obviously ambitious. But a thorough reading of Gotchev’s book would provide us with a unique perspective on aggression and violence, which a scholar with a background in political science usually misses. Readers therefore could discover in Gotchev’s book different practical messages, extracted from social psychology which could be especially useful in modern conflict research and practical conflict management. We summarise them at the end of this review. Suffice here to say that overall the author reveals the complex and controversial dynamics of violence, and suggests that aggression is a big evil, especially dangerous once the genie gets out of the bottle.

Taking off from philosophers like Hobbes and Burke, the author presents to us some classics in theories of human aggression. Aggression is a survival instrument (Konrad Lorenz, p. 56); aggression is an instinct (Sigmund Freud, p. 64). Aggression is also a form of social behaviour, comprehensible from a socio-biological evolutionary perspective (Wilson and van den Berghe, p. 65). Human aggression might also be related to the land property models or to the hunting instinct in humans (Ardrey, p. 71). However amid all the theories explaining conflict by factors inherent in human nature, the one that occupies the central place in Gotchev’s book seems to be Abraham Maslow’s theory of human needs – biological as well as social (p. 77). Gotchev restates Maslow’s basic postulate that human behaviour is significantly determined by the extent to which his basic human needs are met. Gotchev builds his analysis of conflict by recurrently referring to Maslow’s human needs theory.

Alongside, Gotchev also introduces another scholar, namely, John Burton, (p. 78) whose work underlies yet another discussion in Gotchev's book, focused on conflict transformation and conflict management.

What do we learn about conflict analysis from the second body of literature, focused on social factors, responsible for human aggression? How do theories studying exogenous factors contribute to our understanding of conflict behaviour? The answer is simple even if the debate is complex.

These theories suggest that human behaviour is largely determined by social structures, which sometimes incite aggression and conflict. Control over resources or big processes of social transformation may put individuals or groups in conflict. And if analysts could properly address the root causes of conflict it is likely that we would be able to build a working conflict management strategy. Gotchev's point of departure is Jean Jacques Rousseau's social philosophy, whose major message shapes and guides the subsequent debate. Born free, humans are destined to live under constraints (p. 89). Discussions on the class struggle and imperialism follow to include theories of Marx, John Hobson, Joseph Schumpeter, Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin (pp. 91–97). Economic theories of conflict analysis are also herein reviewed, including Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Richard Cobden, John Keynes (pp. 91–92). Conflict resolution theories further include the reformist and revolutionary strategies developed by Marx and Engels, Edward Bernstein, Leo Trotsky, Lenin, Karl Kautsky, as well as the Soviet Communist leaders (pp. 101–120). Gotchev further goes on to review modern thinkers who wrote on imperialism and conflict resolution, such as Paul Kennedy (p. 102); Galtung and Wallerstein (p. 127). And the modern debate on the nation state, nationalism, democracy, group identity and civilisations, integrating political as well as cultural perspectives, ends this rather long presentation of the structural theories on social and international conflict.

Behavioural theories are especially useful in conflict analysis. To them Gotchev turns next. The author observes that modernisation paradigm provides a sound explanation of conflict across states. It looks at the social and political context of violence globally. However, it fails to explain why the same exogenous factors may incite different, even opposing human reactions. To answer this question Gotchev turns to the classical frustration-aggression theory, a dominating paradigm in mid 20th century psychology. Formulated by a group of scholars from Yale University in 1939, this hypothesis posits a connection between frustration and aggression in human behaviour. Does any frustration lead to aggression? Maslow suggests that only frustration related to threats towards basic human needs can lead to aggression (p. 138). But for the purposes of this analysis a more interesting question is how the frustration-aggression hypothesis applies to social groups (p. 147). Gotchev introduces a number of examples illustrating frustration-aggression models in different social groups and discusses key issues related to group aggression. Drawing on Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, the author introduces the concept of 'aggression displacement', denoting a process whereby aggressive reactions reach 'innocent' individuals while actors who incite frustration are strong and cannot be attacked themselves (p. 147). The author also calls attention to the concept of 'image', playing a significant role in decision-making at times of conflict. Referring again to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff's work, Gotchev discusses the issue of the so-called 'mirror images', used to call attention to the psychological threats, arising from the super Power confrontation during the Cold War period. The 'mirror images' concept suggests that the

self-perception images of the peoples of the two super Powers are positive, while the image that each nation develops *vis-à-vis* its enemy is negative. The argument suggests that the 'mirror images' may significantly distort reality, which in times of increasing tension, can incite overreactions, and end up in self-fulfilling prophecies (p. 150). The following discussion builds mostly on the works of Berkowitz, but also of Heider, Weiner, Lanzetta to mention a few (pp. 152–174). It ends by introducing an improved frustration-aggression model, which introduces not only psychological factors but also additional factors, that is, social, as well as cognitive, which arguably shape the reactions of frustrated groups and individuals. Gotchev concludes optimistically: this improved behavioural analytical model would underlie strategies of conflict management, providing means and instruments for conflict resolution, wider than those ensuing from the narrower perspective of social Darwinism theories (p. 175).

"Theories of social learning look at aggression and conflict behaviour as internalised patterns of social behaviour" (p. 177) (reviewer's translation). In this part of his study Gotchev challenges the schools of thought reviewed above and sets about to show that neither human instincts nor cognitive perceptions alone can explain aggression. Referring to psychologist Ivan Pavlov, as well as to Skinner, Miller and Dollard, Gotchev argues that aggression can be seen as a behavioural pattern, assumed as the result of interaction between groups and individuals on the one hand, and their social environment on the other (p. 180). Unlike Pavlov, who suggests that learning is determined by internal and external stimuli (p. 179), Skinner argues that it is determined exclusively by pedagogical mechanisms, such as that of "encouragements" and "punishments" (p. 180). Referring next to Milgram, Gotchev discusses the issue of how people learn aggression by unquestionably subjecting themselves to formal authorities (p. 182). Milgram's experiments suggest that more often than not, people readily comply with orders issued by official authorities, even disregarding the questionable moral admissibility of such orders' (p. 183). Milgram's work thus presents examples to which Gotchev points the readers' attention. Individuals executing orders issued by official authorities show striking human indifference and lack of sensitivity to the physical pain and torture, which they inflict upon the punished individuals (p. 184). Gotchev next discusses Bandura's work, examining closely the meaning of his concept of 'reciprocal determinism'. The latter designates a process of continuous social learning, where cognitive and behavioural factors interact with factors from the social environment (p. 184). The author then examines in detail various strategies of social learning, as well as basic social mechanisms, helping in particular the process of internalisation of patterns of aggression (pp. 189–199).

Theories of interaction admit on an equal footing both endogenous and exogenous factors of conflict. Abraham Maslow's theory of human needs is again the departure point in Gotchev's discussion. Building on his studies, Gotchev goes on to introduce the work of Edward Azar, and emphasise in particular the significance of social needs in conflict escalation or de-escalation. Especially emphasised are the needs for security, identity and self-determination (p. 203). Digging further into the basics of modern conflict theories Gotchev secures a special attention to the relative deprivation and ethnic conflict theories. He discusses in detail the meaning of relative deprivation, social frustration and ethnic conflicts, as they have been developed by Ted Robert Gurr (p. 204). Gotchev also familiarises the reader with theories of revolution developed by James Davies (p. 205). Then drawing on this rich spectrum

of interactive theories, with the concept of human needs at their centre Gotchev re-introduces the significance of conflict analysis for the selection of effective conflict management strategy.

What do sociological theories tell us about conflict? Gotchev reviews the establishment and the evolution of theories of conflict resolution from the end of the First World War to 2005. Building on Marx, yet paying special attention to the work of Georg Simmel, Gotchev reveals the social and structural causes of conflict. Studying conflicts at class and group level helps us to conceive of conflict as an imminent part of social life. This needs the development of a methodology for conflict resolution. Two theoretical streamlines evolve out of the first generation theories of conflict resolution. One is the structural functionalism of Talcott Parsons, which views conflicts as social anomaly (p. 224). The other is the positive conflict functionalism of Lewis Coser, which looks upon social conflict as a necessary social phenomenon (p. 228). Gotchev introduces Coser's classification of conflict. Conflicts are 'realistic', when pursuing strategies towards the attainment of particular objectives. They can also be 'unrealistic', when conflict is a goal in itself (p. 229). This intellectual stream, positing that conflict is a natural phenomenon in social life, has stimulated the subsequent development of conflict management and conflict resolution theories (p. 231). Amid scholars introduced hereafter is the name of Morton Deutsch. His research suggests that conflicts by and large are unpreventable, so the meaningful strategy to pursue is making an attempt at transforming conflict energies into productive undertakings. Conflict transformation strategies – runs further the argument – should take into consideration the fact that conflicts arise also due to communication problems, such as bad inter-group communication, as well as prejudiced inter-group perceptions. And with 'communication problems', placed at the centre of conflict analysis we are just a step away from game theories as analytical and practical tools for conflict management, to which Gotchev turns next (p. 241).

Game theories are not unknown to the Bulgarian reader. However Gotchev's book is a unique opportunity to discuss them in a wider conflict related context. The Chicken dilemma, illustrated by the 1960s Cuban missile crisis; the Prisoners' dilemma, illustrated by the Cold War nuclear balance of power between the two super Powers – these are theoretical matrixes and strong examples (pp. 244–246) from which students of international conflict should learn. The author however observes that game theories are highly abstract as conflict management strategies. So their efficient application would demand development in a practical context. This is a task to be taken by the 'second generation' theories of conflict management, which introduce the idea of alternative actors in international relations, different from the nation-state, and develop tools and methodologies for 'early warning' and conflict prevention.

The so-called 'second generation' theories of conflict management, developed between 1945 and 1965. This is a period known for confrontation and conflict escalation between the two super Powers, where threat and insecurity dominated international relations. Gotchev introduces two alternative intellectual traditions, contributing to peace research, which have established themselves and developed in these years. One of them is that of North American pragmatism, focused on the prevention of nuclear conflict. The other is that of the European structuralism, looking at peace research as a scholarly agenda, where the prevention of war or nuclear conflict is just one element. Gotchev names three scholars who have significantly

contributed to conflict management theories: Boulding, Galtung and John Burton. He also introduces Edward Azar and his theory of protracted social conflict (PSC), which has turned into a fundamental element of successful conflict management policies (pp. 259–260).

The ‘third generation’ theories of conflict management, developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Osgood’s approach for Graduated and Reciprocal Initiatives in Tension Reduction and Axelrod’s analyses of the evolution of cooperation are singled out as amongst the most advanced practical approaches to conflict management developed in this period (p. 272). The ‘third generation’ theories of conflict management work towards the management of ‘destructive conflicts’ and had considerable success in managing inter-state conflict, in particular tension reduction in the nuclear weapons competition between the two super Powers. A number of initiatives in international politics leading to the decrease of confrontation between the two super Powers illustrates the successful development of the theory and practice of conflict management at this time. These include the signing in 1963 of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as well as the negotiations on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) (p. 272). Other than inter-state conflicts, conflict management theories also suggest tools for the management of intra-state conflicts; ‘deep rooted’ conflicts (Burton), intractable conflict (Kriesberg) and the like (p. 273). Gotchev discusses the Harvard school working seminars in problem resolution (p. 274), and also the practice of international and domestic negotiations in conflict management, adopting the analytical problem solving approach (APSA) (p. 275). He also introduces the work by Adam Curle, who suggests increasing the number of actors contributing to conflict management, thereby developing the idea and practice of the so-called ‘second or multi track diplomacy’ (pp. 276–278). Impressive analyses of works by other scholars follow. Reviewed is the work by Johan Galtung and his concept of peace, defined as absence of direct, as well as structural violence (pp. 282–283), as well as the models of conflict transformation suggested by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (pp. 291–302).

Gotchev concludes his book by discussing the most recent theories of conflict management. He notices that practitioners in conflict management nowadays work in international networks, and so can share, expand and enrich their experience. He notes, too, that conflict transformation and conflict resolution remain alternative and competing approaches to conflict management. Reviewed and discussed are theories of Kriesberg (pp. 304–307); Azar (pp. 307–318); and their collaborators and opponents. Gotchev concludes this discussion observing that this intellectual debate has given birth and stimulated the development of theories of early warning and conflict prevention.

To recapitulate, Gotchev’s *Conflict: Theories and Approaches toward Conflict Resolution* is an impressive study of the root causes of conflict, violence and human aggression. It is also a practical handbook introducing theories and practices in conflict resolution. His book presents to us psychological and sociological theories and approaches from European, American and Slavic authors. The major message that this book conveys is, that an effective conflict transformation process rests on a sound conflict analysis. While Gotchev introduces various scholars and schools of thought, a handful of researchers seem to be shaping the scholarly debate running throughout this volume. They include Maslow and his theory of human needs; Dougherty and

Pfaltzgraff and their discussion on the concepts of 'aggression displacement', and 'mirror images'; Milgram and his experiments showing how people learn aggression by unquestionably subjecting themselves to formal authorities; Deutsch and his research in conflicts arising due to communication problems; the various types of game theories, as tools to conflict analysis and conflict management; Edward Azar and the theory of protracted social conflict and finally Osgood's approach for Graduated and Reciprocal Initiatives in Tension Reduction.

Despite all its strengths, the book is vulnerable to criticism on several points. One is that the book's research agenda is overly ambitious. The author has shown encyclopedic theoretical knowledge and summarised much rich practical experience. However the theoretical approaches and frameworks seem to be too many, surely more than a single volume should collect. This prevents a clear expression of a basic message, namely, the development of a basic argument extracted from a theoretical debate of alternative schools of thought. This makes the overall organisation of the book slightly clumsy with some repetitions of authors and theories throughout the chapters.

Yet, Gotchev's publication is especially valuable now, when conflicts in Ukraine, Syria and Iraq, the Middle East and elsewhere show intense dynamics of a complicated nature. A couple of especially useful practical observations stand out. Firstly, the post-Cold war conflict management process is increasingly difficult and complicated. It needs a deeper understanding of the psychological and sociological roots of aggression and violence. Secondly, human needs – biological and social – need to be given every respect should a speedy and efficient conflict resolution be sought. Thirdly, conflict prevention as a strategy is preferable to conflict management. Fourthly, conflict escalation should be contained, for, once begun, the conflict's just and satisfactory arrangement becomes increasingly impossible. Fifthly, violence more often than not goes unpunished. Punishment usually involves innocent and coincidental actors. Lastly, super Powers have developed 'mirror images' of each other, projecting the 'good' on to themselves and the 'bad' on to their opponent. This bears the risk of over-reacting at times of crises and getting into what is known as 'a self-fulfilling prophecy'. Overall, we live in difficult times, when conflict management increasingly becomes a challenge. Who would make it in the field of containment of crisis and conflict management? Gotchev's answer is that there are the intelligent and moderate practitioners working in international networks who have the expertise but also the responsibility towards the building of regional and world peace.

## **Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, (eds.), North Korea and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia**

(Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), pp. 256, ISBN 978-1-4724-1786-2

*Reviewed by Masami Kodama*

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Maintaining peace and prosperity is a *sine qua non* of sovereign states. The difficulties of ensuring peace and security, however, in an increasingly complex international environment, has resulted in many nation states forming various types of security community. For students of international politics, considering the security architecture of Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula represents a particular challenge not least because of the continuing contentious nature of the region's history.

Another challenge stems from the speed with which the regional security environment has changed in the past decade. Firstly, the rapid emergence of China with an apparent intention to be a maritime super power which poses a significant test for the post Second World War geo-political order. Secondly, the continuous nuclear developments as well as ballistic missile testing by the successive leaders of the dynastic regime in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter North Korea or the North). Finally, the pursuit of collective security by the present Japanese government. The combination of these developments makes for a potent mix.

In addition to this, North Korea's abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s remain a distinct sticking point in relations. All of these issues bring with it antagonisms and rivalries that are being played out in the media on an almost daily basis. This ten chapter edited volume plus an Introduction and Conclusion, has the merit that it brings together a coterie of researchers from the US, Japan and the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea or the South). They are able to provide a wealth of facts and data so as to produce a detailed overview of each national actor, their different national interests and a sense of the complexity that comes with six key actors: North Korea, South Korea, the US, China, Japan and Russia.

The multilateral and multinational approaches introduced here are clearly a valuable contribution to the literature and are worthy of praise. As a result of this, the reader will come away with an awareness of the security environment in the region and a sense of the factors that hinder the promotion of denuclearisation. Concomitantly, the way in which the editors and some of the contributors conceive the responsibility and threat of North Korea is something that raises one or two issues. The reason for this is because, from my perspective, security cooperation in the region depends upon how we see the role and significance of the provocations coming

from North Korea and its subsequent threat level. It is through this lens that I wish to direct my comments.

Chapter 1 is one of the most important parts of the book as it deals with the core of the argument namely, whether the denuclearisation of the Peninsula is possible or not. It argues that the Six Party Talks (STP) are "still alive" and remain "the best means" to resolve North Korea's nuclear issues, (p. 9) despite the fact that the talks have been in stasis due to the three nuclear tests of 2006, 2009 and 2013 and other provocations including artillery bombardments and the torpedo attack on the corvette of South Korea. Yet from the author's perspective, "The two Koreas must share joint responsibility for such hostile relations" (p. 14.) He also insists on the need for proposals that includes the abandoning of the "strategic patience" by the US government, arguing that it has become "counter-productive and ineffective" (p. 29).

Chapter 2 explains the current state of affairs of the region and speculates about future prospects. It advances the idea that the European model of security cooperation is relevant to the region. According to the author, "The fact that the European Union started from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is fully suggestive for the conception of a Northeast Asian cooperative body" (p. 36). It should be stressed, however, that cooperation in the European context started among and within member states which shared the same basic norms and values. In summing up this chapter the author asserts that "the Northeast Asia military security cooperation regime is feasible and has a bright future" (p. 53). Yet at the same time he insists that "the security environment of Northeast Asia has been characterized by conflict, animosity, great power dominance, and contradictory interests." (p. 53.)

The title of the third Chapter is 'Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in North Korea.' In this Chapter, two authors assert that the establishment of the Six Parties Talks (SPT) started as a way to mitigate tensions and get the North involved in confidence building measures in the region. They then examine various aspects of North Korea's behaviour in relation to its domestic political situation, telling the reader that the North's recent development of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) has been "typically characterised by brinkmanship." (p. 55) The authors conclude, following an analysis of the historical facts, that the domestic factors had little influence over the shaping and implementation of brinkmanship in North Korea's foreign policy.

As a result they claim that economic sanctions will fail to change its foreign policy. In turn, they suggest that "policies intended to change its perception on external relations are more likely to succeed in achieving that purpose" (p. 70).

The author of chapter 4 says that there has been no indication that Kim Jong-un is interested in liberalisation or security cooperation. The launch of the Unha-3 in 2012 and a third nuclear test in 2013 is indicative of this (p. 70). He also proclaims that "South Koreans on both the right and the left want to see a North Korea that is less menacing and belligerent and more cooperative across a wide range of traditional and non-traditional security issues" (p. 84).

Chapter 5 and 6 both examine the US perspective towards North Korea. While the former deals with the conflicts and compromises between the two from an historical perspective, the latter pays attention to the stance of the present Obama administration. The former suggests that engagement, as a diplomatic tool, has proved to be "more effective than containment in nudging China and Russia towards becoming accepted members of the international community" (p. 111) and could

therefore prove beneficial if applied to the North. The latter, Chapter 6, concludes that the provocations of the North and its hostile attitudes to the US have resulted in there being “little room for President Obama to re-engage the North in a serious manner.” (p. 129).

Chapter 7 maps out aspects of Chinese domestic politics and security cooperation. As to the relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang, it stresses that despite some frictions, it will continue in its present shape for the time being. The author contends that “Beijing most likely acknowledged the three generation patrimonial succession in Pyongyang because it was concerned about the aftermath of its collapse.” (p. 148.) The author also mentions the worst case scenario for China being the collapse of the North which leads to the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Ultimately the author takes the position that as a general rule, “peace and security of the town requires a strong sheriff who executes consistent principles to the outlaws whether they be sticks or candy” (p. 153).

The title of Chapter 8 is ‘China’s Approach to North Korea and Northeast Asian Security Cooperation’. It assesses the strategic relationship between the two countries through an historical chronology. The basic line of the chapter is that the current security environment provides little prospect for the resumption of SPTs, despite China’s persistent call for regional dialogue. From such a position it concludes that “Pyongyang’s retaliation to the international response has directly challenged Beijing’s long-term efforts on North Korea’s denuclearization and regional integration” (p. 173).

Chapter 9 deals with Japan’s domestic politics and North Korea. It examines a series of domestic factors that have influenced Japan’s stance towards North Korea. It suggests that the likelihood of a conciliatory policy, under the Abe administration and the LDP, is not to be expected especially after the LDPs consolidation of power in the wake of the Upper House elections in 2013. Yet, according to him, Japan’s stance has been influenced more strongly by the US-DPRK relations than the domestic factors, and that “The supremacy of this international factor shows few signs of waning” (p.198).

Chapter 10 focuses on Russia and North Korea. From Russia’s perspective the root cause of all the troubles emanating from North Korea’s nuclear programme is the US threat to Pyongyang (p. 218). As a result, it insists that the best way to cope with the North’s nuclear issue is the establishment of a multinational security mechanism for the Korean Peninsula through the auspices of the SPT.

The concluding chapter of the book claims that North Korea’s desire to be a nuclear armed Power has come about because of its leader’s ‘siege mentality’ and that in order to alleviate this mentality new creative thinking and a new approach is necessary. It is upon that basis that the chapter insists that the escalation of sanctions, through UN resolutions, is destined to fail. The best way forward would be to calm the situation through a peace treaty between the US, China and the two Koreas within the framework of the SPT. By doing so, the authors assert that this would bring about the alleviation of the hostilities and the relaxation of tensions.

After reflecting over the collection of interesting arguments I am left pondering which should come first? Carrots or sticks? It appears that some of the authors, have adopted a ‘carrots’ approach, stemming from a belief that the *status quo* including the present series of sanctions through the UN Security Council cannot alleviate the siege mentality of the political leaders of the DPRK.

But in reviewing the past record of the North, another argument is possible. Namely if the aim of the development of a nuclear weapon programme and ballistic missile capability is to secure the supremacy of the leadership of the North *at any price*, then the likelihood of a breakthrough coming solely through negotiations seems slight.

In such a context it is also likely that any kind of economic assistance would be directed to this purpose rather than towards ensuring the wider welfare of the people. The economy then, as Chapter 7 suggests, is vital to the survival of the regime. If the collapse of the North is going to happen, it would be brought about by a failure of the economy. Thus it may be premature to question the significance of sanctions.

The optimistic understanding of the nature of the political leadership of Kim Jong-un is also questionable. Early on in the book it is stated that, "inter-Korean relations were icy in 2012. However, in the mid-and long-term, an improvement in inter-Korean relations in the Kim Jong-un era could be expected" (p. 27.). The same chapter also draws attention to Jan Song-taek in the following manner. "Vice Chairman Jan Song-taek, Kim Jong-un's uncle and official patron, and Jan's associates are reform-minded and pragmatists. The moderates surrounding Kim Jong-un can take pragmatic approaches to economic reform, denuclearization and unification policy in the long run" (p. 30).

The events of December 2013, admittedly while the book was in press, however, paint a different picture. According to the South Korean media the brutal execution of Jan Song-taek and the members of his family in the form of 'extensive executions' took place. Under such circumstances, is it still possible to believe in the pragmatic approach of Kim Jong-un? The impact of this execution is so profound that it has even affected the stance of China towards the North. This was evident in the first official visit to South Korea by Xi Jinping rather than commencing with a visit to the North.

Of course, as already mentioned, these events happened after the book was printed. Nonetheless, could it have been rather *too* early to have assumed that a pragmatic turn was unfolding? This strikes me as even more apparent given the absence of coverage about the issue of human rights in the North. This is perhaps more surprising given that European integration is mentioned as a possible model of the Northeast Asia region in Chapter 2. It seems to have been overlooked that the EU is a union built on the members sharing the same values in democracy and human rights.

Finally, I must point out the continuing failure to comply with the rule of law by the successive leaders of North Korea. In spite of a series of UN Security Council resolutions, the leaders of the DPRK have not given up nuclear developments and the strengthening of the regime's nuclear capacity. If we need some more examples of its attitude to the rule of law, I must add that the North Korea Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council recently highlighted the fact that a Pyongyang-based company with links to the North Korean government called Ocean Maritime Management caused the biggest arms embargo violation case since sanctions were imposed against North Korea and was subsequently added to the UN's list of individuals and entities subject to sanctions in July, 2014.

Thus, in light of the enhanced capacity of the North for WMD since 1993, it would appear to suggest that the political leader regards possession of nuclear weapons as the most essential factor for the survival of the dynastic regime. If that is a

correct evaluation of the situation, it seems extremely unlikely that the regime will allow interference by other states in this matter.

In conclusion this book represents a noble attempt to get to grips with an extremely complex and fluid situation that is often accompanied by unpredictable and violent episodes. By emphasising the use of a ‘carrot oriented approach’ though it could be seen as underplaying the responsibility of North Korea for the current situation. Let me quote from an article issued by *ChosonIlbo*, the oldest and leading South Korean daily newspaper, in 2006. “The government claims it has banished the threat of war thanks to such limitless appeasement. But what we have gained is nothing but the fact that North Korea now has the bomb.” (Appeasement of Korea Goes On Unabated. *ChosonIlbo* (English version). 24 March 2006)

Eight years have now passed since this was written. In the meantime the situation has become much more serious. It is not just that the ‘bomb’ has become more powerful but also the regime’s ability to target and to deliver it has been substantially enhanced. The sort of wider Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia, as envisioned in the book, at this particular historical moment, while very laudable, looks like being a bridge too far.

## **J.G. Merrills: 2012. International Dispute Settlement**

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 5<sup>th</sup> edition), pp. 360,  
ISBN 978-0-521-15339-3

*Reviewed by Karsten Ronit*

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This textbook appeared in 1984, has been updated several times and now appears in its fifth edition. Its purpose is basically to describe and analyse the international system of conflict resolution between states, its principles and how they have been employed since the second world war, but it also draws on a number of historical examples.

Dispute settlement laid down in treaties, conventions and agreements is an important element in international law. The book is written in the legal tradition, but the solving of conflicts between sovereign states is of course also a crucial aspect of international relations, and the book is equally relevant to this discipline. The role of courts in domestic politics and the place of similar bodies in the international realm have not occupied a central role in political science and its various sub-disciplines. However, in some fields there is a body of research. Indeed, more examples from international relations studies could have been filtered into the analysis, and there are still some challenges in bringing different scholarly traditions together in the study on dispute settlement.

The book is structured into three parts. The first five chapters focus on the processes of dispute settlement, the next five chapters address particular bodies and issue areas, and the third and final section is a chapter that summarises the different findings.

To offer a kind of framework Merrills identifies a number of tools and processes that generally characterise international dispute settlement and figure prominently in this part of the legal literature. These tools and processes cover the ‘softer’ forms of diplomatic exchanges where states keep their autonomy, and the ‘harder’ forms where different measures of autonomy are surrendered to independent third parties with whose decisions the conflicting parties are supposed to comply. Thus, we are introduced to important concepts (e.g. negotiation, mediation, inquiry, conciliation and arbitration), and different cases are discussed to illustrate how dispute settlement can be analysed with the help of these concepts.

The next five chapters direct attention towards particular bodies and how they work in relevant policy fields (the International Court of Justice and its predecessor, relevant entities in the maritime sector, in trade and in the UN system as well as in a number of regional organisations). The chapters show that dispute settlement is

practiced in many and very different areas of international affairs. Although all areas are competently described and analysed, it is not clear why they have been included in the study, and whether some are omitted. While some of these areas and institutions are definitely not covered in existing international relations studies, dispute settlement in the UN and WTO are studied in international relations and international political economy, but this literature is only marginally dealt with in this book.

The last part of the book summarises the findings. Here the tools and processes are discussed in view of the different cases, and the approaches of the different bodies are evaluated. The examination of tools and processes, in the previous chapters somehow presented as generic concepts available to characterise all forms of dispute settlement, are finally discussed in the light of change. Not all types are currently employed and relevant, and the conclusion arrives at a differentiated understanding of the role of negotiation and adjudication in dispute settlement.

Merrills identifies important limitations and argues that improvements can be made in the various legal mechanisms, but emphasises that political support is obviously needed to reform institutions and practices. Only modest optimism is in place.

The conclusion mentions that dispute settlement has seen the emergence of many new institutions that need further scrutiny. Such an endeavour should, in the reviewer's opinion, embrace the many private institutions that are today active in international dispute settlement. To a limited extent Merrills pays attention to this category of dispute settlement (pp. 106–111) but soon leaves it again. There is a growing understanding in law as well as in political science that dispute settlement bodies have come to play an important part in global governance, so let us hope that future textbooks will include both public and private bodies and seek to reach an integrated understanding of their roles.

## **Merje Kuus, *Geopolitics and Expertise: Knowledge and Authority in European Diplomacy***

(Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014). pp. 240, ISBN 1118291743 (hbk), ISBN 9781118291740 (pbk)

*Reviewed by Hugo Meijer*

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While a rich body of literature exists on the formal institutions that compete in the decision-making process of the European Union's (EU) foreign policy – and on the tensions between the national and supranational logics within it – the role of expertise and knowledge production in shaping Europe's foreign policy making is less well understood. This book seeks to address this gap in the literature by exploring how expert knowledge is produced and circulated within European institutions – through both formal and informal networks – and how it shapes and informs the EU's foreign policy making. Expertise in Brussels “is subject to a constant tug-of-war over what claims, by whom, are the most expert among many others” and therefore requires an investigation into the “social processes by which certain knowledge claims come to be considered authoritative” (pp. 2–3). To do so, in line with the so-called ‘practice turn’ in the study of international affairs,<sup>1</sup> Merje Kuus investigates diplomacy as a social practice, with a focus on the intellectual and social apparatus of knowledge production that underpins EU foreign policy *vis-à-vis* its eastern neighbourhood. The underlying question concerns “the ways in which geographical arguments are continuously made and re-made by political agents in specific social contexts” and in which “EU professionals use or deploy specific claims of expertise in their daily work” (pp. 3 and 15).

From a theoretical standpoint, this study is anchored in a specific approach to international relations (IR) – critical geopolitics – that investigates “the geographical assumptions and designations that enter into the making of world politics, ... by examining the ways in which political actors conceive and practice international politics in spatial terms – how they represent places as particular kinds of places to be approached in particular ways – critical geopolitics elucidates the modes of analysis that make certain geopolitical practices legible and legitimate” (p. 30).<sup>2</sup> Within

1 Christian Lequesne, ‘EU Foreign Policy Through the Lens of Practice Theory: Approaching the European External Action Service Differently,’ *Guest Lecture Series*, University of Trento, April 29 (2014); Iver Neumann, ‘Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: the Case of Diplomacy,’ *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2002), pp. 627–651; Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

2 On critical geopolitics, see also Merje Kuus, ‘Critical Geopolitics’, in R. Denmark (ed.), *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, Volume 2 (London: Blackwell, 2010).

this overall approach to IR, the analytical framework adopted by Kuus to investigate the social power struggles through which expert authority is created in Brussels is inspired by and builds upon the work of Pierre Bourdieu and, in particular, the concepts of social field, symbolic capital, and habitus. Departing from positivist approaches to foreign policy analysis, the author scrutinises the social, cultural, and symbolic capital mobilised by EU foreign policy professionals who are embedded in specific social fields and who struggle for transnational capital in Brussels. Accordingly, by combining critical geopolitics and sociology in the study of foreign policy making, Kuus seeks to illuminate the inner workings of knowledge creation and power in transnational diplomatic settings.

Empirically, this work focuses on the eastern direction of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In particular, it aims to trace “how geopolitical arguments are deployed by foreign policy professionals” and how Europe’s eastern neighbourhood is conceived and “produced as an object of knowledge in Brussels – by whom, with what tools, and through what struggles” (pp. 196–197). To do so, it relies on a rich body of primary sources, namely 110 interviews with EU professionals in the Commission, in the European External Action Service (EEAS), in think tanks, and in the permanent representations of the member states. The aim is to “produce a more ‘peopled’ story of how ENP is actually crafted, tested, modified, and solidified by [EU] professionals” (p. 114). This book therefore provides an agency-based and empirically grounded meticulous analysis of the daily practice of transnational diplomacy in Brussels.

*Geopolitics and Expertise* proposes a relevant theoretical, empirical, and methodological contribution to the study of knowledge production and expertise in the making of EU foreign policy. First, the blending of critical geopolitics, Bourdieusian sociology, and actor-centred foreign policy analysis offers an original and innovative approach to the analysis of “whose expertise, from where, succeeds, and whose fails, and why” in shaping European external relations (p. 2). Secondly, in line with a focus on everyday life experience and daily diplomatic practices, the strong emphasis on interviews and detailed empirical research provides a rich material on “the individuals who actually make policy” and on how, beyond formal institutions, the “informal features of daily bureaucratic and cultural practices” influence knowledge production in Brussels (p. 39). Finally, in the path of the so-called ‘practice turn’ in IR, Merje Kuus raises and engages an important methodological debate on the contribution and limits of ethnographic methods in the study of foreign policy in light of “the logistical and intellectual difficulties” of ethnographic fieldwork in a usually secretive realm such as foreign policy – also examined in more detail elsewhere.<sup>3</sup> This study therefore offers an important and original contribution to the field of European foreign policy analysis.

While giving a rich, diversified, and complex picture of the generation and diffusion of expert authority in Brussels, what might have further strengthened the book would have been a tighter and more cohesive core argument throughout the different chapters. As the author acknowledges in conclusion, “the investigation does not yield a neat package of findings” (p. 196). Indeed, each chapter examines one specific facet of knowledge and expertise production in the EU (e.g. the impact of the 2004 eastern enlargement on Europe’s bureaucratic structures, the formal and

3 Merje Kuus, ‘Foreign Policy and Ethnography: A Sceptical Intervention’, *Geopolitics*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2013).

informal decision-making processes of the ENP, etc.) but without a clearly articulated central argument that neatly ties up the different chapters and the multiple dimensions of the analysis. In other words, despite its theoretical originality and empirical strength, the book could have elucidated more incisively the key findings on how foreign policy expertise is generated in Brussels and on the underlying social power struggles that shape its creation and diffusion.

Also, despite its stated goals, *Geopolitics and Expertise* does not explain how – or whether – foreign policy processes, and the role of expertise therein, shape and mould EU foreign policy outcomes in general, and the ENP in particular. The author rightly points out that, in the existing literature on the ENP, “we know what has happened after the fact, but the process of knowledge creation that makes these developments possible remains out of focus. The policy appears as a black box: outputs emerge, but their production remains hidden inside the box. To develop a more nuanced understanding of ENP, we cannot deduce the policy process from its outcomes but must make the process and object of analysis in its own right” (pp. 112–113). This work nevertheless then falls short of tracing the relationship between the intricacies of knowledge production in Brussels’ policy processes and the content of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood policy, i.e. its impact on policy outcomes. In conclusion, the author does suggest, in Bourdieusian terms, that the analysis of the transnational field of European diplomacy “does not allow us to outline a neat set of causes (why a policy outcome occurred) but it does enable us to develop a deeper understanding of the causal structures that tilt the field of policy practice in particular ways” (p. 202). However, the reader is left with the unanswered question of how the characteristics of knowledge and expertise production in Brussels have ‘tilted’ the ENP. Accordingly, while this study greatly enriches the current understanding of the dynamics of knowledge production and circulation in the European policy process, it does not clearly bring to light whether and how they have an impact on EU foreign policy outcomes.

Overall, this study is a relevant, original, and innovative contribution to the literature on foreign policy analysis and on European diplomacy. It also opens a number of important venues for future research in FPA, including international comparative enquiries into the specificities of European transnational expertise versus more ‘traditional’ state-centred expertise, as well as inter-sectoral analyses on how knowledge production varies among policy areas (e.g. energy policy, foreign trade, internal security, defence policy).