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2 From Inter-State War to Warlordism: Changing Forms of Collective Violence in the International System

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Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War the forms of violent conflicts in the international system have undergone a tremendous change. The classical war between states accounted for less than 25% of the 196 wars between 1945 and 1996. Violent intra-state conflicts have become the major feature of warlike events in this period. According to these findings, theories of both the realistic school and liberal institutionalism do not provide a sound explanation of the current status of war and peace in the international system. While Realism is focused on an interpretation of war as the outcome of international relations modeled around a state-centric view in which only states occur as actors, liberal institutionalism is captured by the dream that a global civil society emerges able to mitigate the negative results of state power and to foster international relations on the basis of mutually shared norms and values.

While both theories may help to explain historical developments and political events characterizing international politics at the moment, the form and occurrence of violent conflicts, however, is gradually escaping the grip of both of them.¹ And while Realism tends to become blind concerning the changing forms of war, liberal institutionalism tends to focus only on one side of the coin of global development. However, the spread of NGOs and other nonstate actors in international politics is not just a step towards more inter- and transnational cooperation, but also is accompanied by an increasing number of non-state actors using the means of violence without any superior control, and somehow fueling their means of warfare by making use of the spread of NGOs.²

This article attempts to answer the following questions: which direction have wars, as a major phenomenon in the field of international relations, taken since the end of the Second World War? Second, how we can reach for an explanation of this development? To this end, the first part will give a brief description of some general statistical trends and patterns of war development since 1945. These observations are based on the data gathered by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF), the Study Group on the Causes of War at Hamburg University.³ As statistical findings have to be interpreted in the light of theoretical devices, the second chapter presents some basic assumptions of the so-called 'Hamburg Approach', the theoretical framework developed by the AKUF.⁴ The Hamburg Approach draws rather more on works of classical sociology than theories of international relations. Against the background of the statistical findings and the theoretical framework, in a third step the development of so-called 'war economies' and the emergence of warlordism will be presented as one field of further research.

Statistical Trends of War Development since 1945

How wars have developed over time is one of the most frequently asked questions in the area of peace research. The scientists involved in the academic study of war and peace have assembled a mass of material and data about the main trends of war development, of types and kinds of organized violence in history. Furthermore, the numerous academic efforts to quantify organized mass violence differ in their general orientation, specific questions and their operational definitions. Thus, in this chapter an account of the state of the art cannot be given, because a complete overview about all efforts made in this direction or even about all current research projects deserves a study for itself.⁵ The aim of this chapter is rather to present some results of the long-standing research project undertaken by the AKUF and to stimulate critical comments and remarks on results which have not yet been published in English.

The academic effort to quantify organized mass violence demands first a precise definition of the phenomena referred to as war. Thus, the understanding of war has to be limited to an operational definition as opposed to other phenomena of collective violence, like banditry, rebellions, mutinies, organized crime, coup d'états, etc. It is exactly with this definition that the dispute within the discipline starts. Therefore we

must begin by giving the definition of war used by the AKUF. In contrast to many other projects, the AKUF does not use strict quantitative criteria and defines war in the following manner:

A war is a violent mass conflict, fulfilling the following three characteristics:

1. two or more armed forces are involved in the fighting, where at least one of them is a regular armed force of a government in power (military, police forces, paramilitary forces);
2. both sides show a minimum of centrally directed organization of the battles even if this means only organized defense or strategically planned attacks; and
3. the armed operations show a certain degree of continuity and are not simply spontaneous, occasional confrontations. The involved actors are acting according to a recognizable strategy.

This definition – war as a state-related, organized and continuous violent mass conflict – still has many disadvantages, but includes, unlike so many other definitions, the increasing number of intra-state conflicts without relying on questionable indicators such as the number of battle related deaths etc. The AKUF does not use quantitative criteria like numbers of victims or battle related fatalities, since these data must be considered to be highly unreliable. In numerous cases of wars the AKUF counts as such, these data are even not at hand. Apart from this, there are no good reasons to decide whether just battle related deaths should be considered or whether combat fatalities or death tolls caused by famine and diseases should be considered as well. How many wounded persons can count as a dead one? These questions can not be solved by strict quantification. Rather, we must take more or less arbitrary decisions. So this definition tries to avoid the appearances of quantitative exactness and in practice each case which seems to be questionable has to be discussed within the study group. Because of this very soft definition, the scope of organized violence the AKUF takes into consideration is much larger than that of others. Certainly there are a lot of cases in the data of the AKUF which other scholars would argue do not meet their definition of war.

Based on this definition of war, the AKUF counted 196 wars in the period between the end of World War II and new year's eve 1996. In 1996 the AKUF registered 28 wars of which two, in Chechnya and Mali,

definitely ended in the same year.⁶ With some more differentiation we can observe five major trends in war development since 1945.⁷

First observation: The number of wars per year has steadily increased

The number of wars fought per year has steadily increased until the year 1992, which marks, with 52 wars, the peak since 1945. According to our analysis, this increasing number of wars per year is largely due to the fact that wars last longer and longer. Taking into account the numbers of wars that begin each year and the number of wars ending per year, the increase can not be traced to a growing number of new wars.

Second observation: The overwhelming majority of wars since 1945 are intra-state wars

In the period of time under scrutiny 129 out of 196 wars were intra-state wars, while only in 43 cases did wars in the classical sense of inter-state wars occur. The remaining cases are mixed types, showing components of both intra-state and inter-state war. A closer examination shows that this development is due to two phenomena: firstly, in the period in question the importance of inter-state wars has decreased in comparison to other epochs. And secondly, there is a constant decrease of inter-state wars within the period since 1945.

Civil wars and other forms of collective violence involving only one party which could be considered as a state actor, have been the most frequent forms of violent mass conflicts since 1945. Thus, the classical usage of the term war, referring only to violent conflicts between states, would cover only a small and decreasing proportion of warlike events. It is the growing amount of armed intra-state conflict that causes the growth in the period after 1945. Anti-regime wars and other intra-state wars waged about secession or autonomy of regions have been the most frequent types of war in the last few decades. The classical inter-state war has become the exception among violent mass conflicts.

Third observation: More than 90 per cent of the 196 wars between 1945 and 1996 took place in countries of what used to be called the Third World

The geographical spread of wars indicates that the causes of war since the end of the Second World War must obviously be sought in the social and

political dynamics of the so called Third World.⁸ In the developing countries a growing amount of armed mass violence can be observed.⁹ In contrast to this belligerency of the Third World, there are just a few intra-state wars to be registered in the industrialized capitalistic countries of the West and no inter-state war took place between them in the period under scrutiny. In other words: while developing societies normally show a certain amount of organized violence within their boundaries and among each other, the developed capitalist democracies can be labeled as a war-free zone. This empirical fact is to be discussed in the discipline of International Relations under the conception of 'democratic peace'. Or as we would rather put it: the peace between developed capitalist societies.

Nevertheless, the so called great powers were involved in a large number of violent conflicts. In particular, the former colonial powers, Great Britain and France, the US and the former USSR took part most frequently in the wars since 1945. According to the ranking of states involved in warfare, Britain leads with 18, the US (12) and France (11) are number three and four.¹⁰ But they almost exclusively took part as interveners, that is to say they engaged in ongoing wars on behalf of one party or as members of UN missions, rather than starting wars. Mainly, these interventions occurred to back a certain regime in power which was contested by a sub-state actor. But we have to emphasize that most wars after 1945 took place in the regions of the Third World. And the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast-Asia were the most war-torn regions.

Fourth observation: All through the period since 1945, intra-state wars last significantly longer than wars between states

Whereas the majority of wars between states are finished within one year, intra-state wars tend to become protracted conflicts. The wars in Angola, Cambodia, on the Philippines, in Kurdistan or in Columbia are examples of such protracted conflicts which last more than 20 years. The longest lasting war we have in our list of ongoing wars is the war in Myanmar (Burma) which started in 1948. So the history of independence of Myanmar is a history of war. On the other hand, the brief war between Peru and Ecuador in 1994 illustrates how internal protest and pressure from the international community can be more successful in bringing war to an end when the case in question is an inter-state war.

There is ample speculation about this observation. One could refer to the tendencies of ever growing interdependencies between states and political

actors. In the perspective of the stream of liberal thought on international relations one could argue that international institutions can deal better and better with interstate-violence, because the norms of peaceful behavior increasingly dominate the interaction between states. This is an argument belonging to the old tradition of liberal thought on international relations.¹¹ An alternative interpretation, out of the realist perspective, would refer to a hierarchy in international relations which ensures the control of inter-state conflicts by the great powers because they are interested in maintaining the status quo of the international order.¹² This is not the place to add to these speculations. But it is worthwhile to underline the fact that we do not yet have a really satisfactory explanation for the decreasing importance of international war.

Fifth observation: 65 wars since 1945 were ended by mediation of a third party

In asking the question how wars have come to an end in the period under consideration, only 28 wars ended with a military victory for the aggressive side. Out of 161 wars being considered as ended, in 42 cases it was the defending side that could repulse the aggression, and 65 wars were ended by mediation of a third party.¹³ If we differentiate these findings further, the chance of the defending party in repulsing the aggressor in intra-state wars is higher than in inter-state wars. Moreover, there is a significantly lower percentage of intra-state wars that could be finished through the mediation of a third party. Mediation seems to be more successful in inter-state wars and in around 62 per cent of all cases ended by mediation between 1945 and 1992, the UN (40.5 per cent) or regional organizations acted as mediators.¹⁴

Obviously there is an increasing number of wars ended by mediation, and supra-national organizations and non-state actors are the most prominent mediators. This observation too could be used as a confirmation of liberal institutionalism. In other words, the ever growing interdependencies between states seem to enforce the building of institutions which can be used to control conflicts and in order to avoid the use of violence.

Let us close this brief presentation of statistical findings with a glance at the most recent developments: The early 1990s have shown a greater number of violent conflicts than ever seen before in the period since 1945. But when we look at the curve for the period after 1992, we can see an

obvious decrease in the number of wars led per year. There have been other regressions and when compared with other decades the level of wars today is still high. Nevertheless, the decline is dramatic and needs a precise explanation.¹⁵

Part of this explanation might be what happened in the former Soviet Union and its zone of influence. Until 1989 this zone was almost warfree, despite its public image. The dramatic increase which led to the record of 52 wars in 1992 is largely due to the demise of the state-socialist system which brought 12 new wars along, of which 10 had come to a precarious end by 1996. Apart from the events in the former Soviet Union, which can be held responsible for the rapid increase and the following decline, no new trend of war development is observable which separates the period after the Cold War from the decades before.

Thus, the main findings based on the research by the AKUF can be summarized as follows: the increasing number of wars since 1945 is largely due to an increasing number of intra-state wars in Third World states. These intra-state wars tend to last longer than inter-state wars and are more difficult to end by classical political efforts and mediation of third parties. These findings apply equally to the period after 1989 when the area of formerly state-socialist countries became plagued by wars.

War Development and the 'Great Transformation'

From the perspective of a political scientist it is perhaps most astonishing that the discipline of international relations has so far not developed a coherent explanation of why wars have developed in this way over the last decades. According to some scholars of the discipline, this lack of explanation may be due to the fixation on conceptions of statehood and political forms that date from the classical era of the European state system. On the one hand, these conceptions of European state-building from the 16th century onwards have little in common with the historical realities of our time. Furthermore, a transhistorical explanation of war is neither possible nor would it make sense, not to mention a mathematical one. On the other hand the fact that most wars in the period considered are intra-state wars in the Third World leads us to reflect on the processes of state-building and social change in these regions which have inherited their political and economic structures from their former European colonial powers. The form and the social bases of most of these wars indicate that

the emergence of violent mass conflicts in developing countries is linked with the 'Great Transformation', as Karl Polanyi called the process of imposition of capitalist modernity.¹⁶

According to the Hamburg Approach, the origins of most ongoing wars can be found in this fundamental transformation of traditional societies, the successive spread of elements of modern capitalist society in a global dimension. This transformation is a non-linear process in which traditional modes of production, forms of social organization and political domination as well as traditional ideas and values are gradually superseded by patterns of modern capitalistic societies. Since all developing societies are affected by this transformation, it gives us in a historical and systematic perspective the general standard for comparative studies. With respect to violent conflicts, the Great Transformation shows thereby two contradictory faces: while developed capitalist societies are characterized by internal peace politically based on democracy and the rule of law, the developing process itself is characterized by a series of violent conflicts and wars. Therefore the peaceful development of western states based on a network of the rule of law, democratic participation, the state monopoly of physical force, social justice, interdependencies, and the control of passions – the so-called 'Hexagon of Civilization' – is a late and still precarious result of this social transformation.¹⁷

As in European history, the transformation of traditional societies in the Third World is confronted with a break-down of traditional forms of conflict regulation. The Great Transformation has first and foremost to be considered as the complete destruction of previously valid forms of life and social reproduction. Therefore, the modernization process becomes the central conflict generating variable for the explanation of global war development. A regionally and historically comparative perspective could reveal that the structural aspects of the state-building processes in Third World regions is not so much different from what happened in the so-called developed world over the last few centuries. Rather, the differences must be found in the historical conditions and in the ways this transformation leads to mass violence.

The modern nation-state in the former colonial world is not the outcome of a long-lasting process of integration, characterized by the struggle of different political units, but the imposed form of integration guaranteed from outside – by the international system. Not the formation of the state monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, but the struggle for this

formally granted monopoly characterizes the political development. Whereas the process of state-building in Europe was accompanied by a huge amount of violence, both between and within states, in contemporary Third World regions mass violence is almost exclusively a phenomenon within states.

The dominance of intra-state wars reveals a characteristic specific to developing societies: the institutions of the modern state in these countries are usually not capable of mediating the social conflicts resulting from society's transformation to capitalism. The state is not the crystallization point of collective identity, but only a formal framework acquired during the colonial past and guaranteed by world state order and international law. The modern state, described by Max Weber by the claim to monopolize the use of force, by compulsory jurisdiction and continuous operation within a certain territory, exists in many Third World countries as a mere territorial and legal cover, as an imposed form whose social content has yet to consolidate itself. In this consolidation process violence is still a rational option for self-enrichment or for gaining political power. Only in fully fledged capitalist societies has physical violence become dysfunctional. Here, the general rule of civic-capitalist forms of behavior and social organization even determines the external behavior of states. The balance of powers, the constitutional state, the rule of law, democracy and general welfare obviously constitute a bulwark against the emergence of warlike conflicts within and between developed societies. Thus, the undeniable violent trail of capitalism in history cannot be understood as quality of capitalism itself, but as a condition of its emergence and advancement.

Against this background, two general structural features are discernible explaining the war development in the Third World:

1. The attempt at an inner consolidation of formally established statehood. In most developing societies a huge gulf between the political and social integration of their people is discernible. This leads to a chronic deficit of legitimacy of state rule. Not the postcolonial state but tribal, ethnic or religious groups are the points of reference for identity and political loyalty. The modern state only exists as a territorial frame, whose internal institutional setting has still to be consolidated, guaranteed by the world state system and by international law.
2. A tendency towards diffusion and privatization of physical force. The essential point of this consolidation process of the state is the

formation of a legitimate monopoly of the use of physical force. However, wars like in Afghanistan, Somalia or Columbia show that the historical development can also follow an opposite path. Not the monopolization of violence and the establishment of the rule of law, but a tendency of diffusion of physical force can be observed. Physical force becomes a power resource of regionally, religiously, ethnically or ideologically mobilized militias and their 'warlords', of various groups of organized crime or of independently acting state organizations, so-called antinomic violence, following their particular political and economic interest. Against the theoretical background of modern statehood, these are all phenomena which can be labeled as privatization of physical force.

To sum up this brief description of some of the theoretical assumptions of the Hamburg Approach: the Global Transformation offers in a historical and systematic perspective the general standard for comparative research; the dichotomic ideal types of tradition and modernity and the sociological conceptions attached to them provide us with a conceptional apparatus grounded in social theory; the understanding of the modernizing process as a contradictory whole of integrating, civilizing and pacifying developments on the one hand and as a process characterized by disintegrating, destructive and violent phenomena on the other; the inner consolidation of formally established statehood and the tendency of diffusion and privatization of physical force as two general structural features of war development since 1945.

Nevertheless, this structural analysis based on social theory is not sufficient to answer the question why in a specific case actors are willing to use the means of violence in conflicts. The conflictive developments of social transformation must not necessarily lead to violent conflicts. Modernization and war development are in an explanatory connection but they don't determine each other. In the end, the concrete actors decide about the form of conflictive action in conflicts triggered by social transformation. But social action is not structurally determined, but historically contingent. Therefore, research on causes of war has to confront the problem of indeterminacy in social action and to explain in case studies how the use of physical force is legitimated by the resort to the world of symbolic representation of the groups involved in war.¹⁸

War Economies and Warlordism

As intensive case studies are not the subject of this article we would like to finish with a topic which has been hitherto almost neglected, but indicates a field for future research efforts which do not only want to reach for explanation but also to contribute something to the political agenda. Despite the brilliant book – ‘*Economie des guerres civiles*’ – of the research group around Jean-Christoph Rufin and Francois Jean the economic side of ongoing wars is an almost neglected aspect.¹⁹ When we look at the most prominent wars in the last few years, where the outlooks to end them are the darkest, we have to realize that wars have begun to live on themselves. In Colombia as in Afghanistan, in Liberia as in Myanmar, war has become a system of social reproduction. On the one hand costly for the population, on the other profitable for a small minority.

While there is a correlation between developed capitalism and the pacification of conflicts, war and trade are not mutually exclusive. War does not mean an end of economic exchange but that the economy becomes a means of warfare. Under the conditions of classical inter-state war the control of the national economy by an authoritarian state was often decisive for the outcome of a war. During the Cold War period the supply of armament, foreign military advisers and financial aid by the super powers became an important aspect of regional wars. Since the end of the bipolarity of the international system at the latest, actors in regional wars are more and more compelled to secure their material reproduction beyond politically inspired foreign support. In many of the protracted violent conflicts in the Third World violence meanwhile has become for itself a means of economic power. In those cases the use of violence is no longer aiming at political goals, but to secure the material base of militias and to enrich their leaders. The ‘warlord’, as a political and military leader, has become an ‘entrepreneur’ whose economic activities are grounded in military power and the use of force.

With the total collapse of the state, violence became the essential resource to gain economic profits and political and economic power were in one hand. It would be erroneous to believe that these war economies only live on the dark sides of the world market. Not only weapons and drugs are exported from war areas. Timber, iron ore, diamonds and even human labor force are export goods of societies at war. However, the purchasers of these ‘commodities of war’ are not at all obscurant organizations only involved in black market deals. The British African Mining Consortium as well as

the French Sollac company were purchasing iron ore from Liberian warlords. Also many European companies are engaged in the so-called 'arms-for-nature-swaps', for example the exchange of tropical timber against weaponry. During the civil war in Liberia this country became the third most important supplier of timber to France.²⁰ The white zones of the world market know how to profit from the existence of war economies too, and so the international community has not shown serious efforts to bring these links under control.

The ongoing wars in Cambodia, Myanmar and Sri Lanka are other cases in point showing how the appropriation of resources by the use of violence has become an independent force in protracted conflicts. The war in Cambodia was and is accompanied by an extensive exploitation of national resources such as tropical timber, mineral resources, precious stones and antiques. The number of Thai companies, which are in the north-western frontier zone of Cambodia dealing with the Khmer Rouge in timber, has been estimated around fifteen. The Thai economy is linked with the war economy of the Khmer Rouge by cross-border transportation lines. Beside their political and military organization, the Khmer Rouge also established centrally controlled forms of economic organization.²¹

In Myanmar too, the appropriation of national resources plays a central role in the strategies of the warring parties. In addition Myanmar is considered to be the worlds biggest producer of opium and heroin. Its production of raw opium doubled between 1982 and 1988 from 400 to 800 tons per year, and the control of drug production and trafficking plays a major role in the war development in Myanmar. One of the most prominent warlords in Myanmar, the so-called 'king of drugs' Khun Sa, had around 40 per cent of the drug business under his control and established between 1993 and 1996 with his 'Mon-Thai-Army' an independent 'Shan state' in the north east of the country. At the same time, however, almost 60 per cent of the areas for opium cultivation were in the hands of the official army and the military regime in Rangoon is suspected of playing an increasing role in the drug business of the country.²²

Diasporas providing warring militias with economic means is another feature of long-lasting intra-state wars which can be observed in the wars in Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Kurdistan or the former Yugoslavia. The Tamil diaspora in Western Europe and the US, for instance, can be considered as both a result and a guarantee for the continuation of the civil war in Sri Lanka. Between 1983 and 1992 almost 40 per cent of the Tamil population

of the Jaffna peninsula, the central war zone in Sri Lanka, left for Europe and the US. Organized by the 'World Tamil Coordinating Committee' the Tamil Tiger militia is levying war-taxes under the migrant population to finance their war for the establishment of a Tamil state in Sri Lanka.²³

Despite agricultural raw materials, mineral resources, drugs and war-taxes, human aid given by NGOs is increasingly becoming an important resource for internal warfare. Warlords and militias are organizing the supply of foreign aid into the regions under their control and functioning thereby as racketeers, as 'someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction'.²⁴ It is peculiar that by foreign aid, resources out of the international system are imported directly into the local conflict scene. It makes one apprehensive that an analysis of the relations between humanitarian assistance and intra-state wars comes to the result that: 'it represents...a resource which political and economic actors are looking for to appropriate and use for their interests'.²⁵

According to Waldmann, the differences between inter-state wars and intra-state wars are somehow institutionalized in the figure of the warlord. He emerges after the collapse of state structures and as racketeer he and his militia provide state functions at a low level. As a product of war and with the use of force as his power base, a warlord is not interested in a peaceful solution of the ongoing conflict.²⁶ While being a leader of a locally based militia the warlord is acting in the international realm as entrepreneur connecting the local war economy with the world market. A shift in the power relations of the warring militias, the disarmament of his troops or the cut of his economic ties to the outer world would lead to an end of his powerful position. Warlords and their war economies are therefore a major obstacle to finding peaceful conflict solutions.

Conclusion

The statistical findings of the AKUF clearly show a shift from inter-state to intra-state wars since the end of World War Two. This trend is accompanied by a tendency of intra-state wars to last longer and be more difficult to end through the mediation of a third party. This is due to the fact, that protracted violent conflicts tend to develop a kind of self dynamic which is closely linked with the institution of the warlord and the emergence of war economies. Based on the theoretical assumption that the underlying conflicts are triggered by the social transformation happening in

Third World countries, the main causes of these wars must be found within the changing societies of the countries at war. According to these findings Realist explanations of war, still concentrated on inter-state wars, seem to be odd, or as Holsti has put it: there is no anarchy between Third World states but within them.²⁷ This anarchy within Third World states must be analyzed in comparison to the process of state formation in Europe. Charles Tilly, for instance, showed in his work the interrelation between state-formation, social change and wars in Europe.²⁸ Thereby one can find structural analogies to what is happening in our times in the Third World. Furthermore, the dissolution of state structures in protracted conflicts like in Afghanistan, Liberia, Myanmar, Somalia etc. could be subordinated under the category of feudalisation, used by Norbert Elias to explain the decay of political authority in Europe before the advent of the absolutist state.²⁹

However, the political and economic environment in which these wars are taking place is completely different from what was to happen in European history, as the example of the 'modern' warlord shows. We are at present confronted with a picture of an inner consolidation of formally established statehood, guaranteed from outside by the international state system. A process of state formation which, nevertheless, sometimes leads internally to the complete destruction of what can be called a state. The 'billiard ball' state of the Realist construction of the international system turns than out to be a fragmented society falling apart from within.

Regarding the presented statistical trends of war development since 1945, the other thing we should bear in mind is the fact that they only show the peak of organized violence in the period considered. By definition, we excluded all forms of organized violence which show no direct involvement of governmental forces or which are lacking our criteria of mass-character and continuity. But the closer we look at developments in various world regions, the more we are confronted with changes in the forms of violence. In Latin America, in Africa, as well as in parts of the former Soviet Union a tendency towards the privatization of violence can be observed. Whether we talk of organized crime, terrorism, youth-gangs or so-called antinomic violence, all of them may be indicators that 'violence will trickle down' in the politically uncontrolled spheres of world society. Results which are not only a threat for societies with a yet unfinished process of state-building, but also for developed capitalistic societies which take the once arduously acquired democratic state under the rule of law as

granted. Therefore warlordism, war economies, the privatization of violence and their complex linkages to the international system mark an important field for future research. In a time when we are being told that the coming epoch will face a 'clash of civilizations' we must emphasize that wars and violent conflicts are among the most complex social phenomena and their explanation needs a reflected and critical approach. Buying into simplistic interpretations may otherwise turn out to be self-fulfilling-prophecies.

Notes

- 1 In a recent example Fearon is giving a 'rationalist explanation for war' based on the 'ideal case of rational unitary states' and showing 'how war could occur given the assumption of rational and unitary ('billiard ball') states', Fearon, James D. 1995: 'Rationalist Explanations of War', *International Organization* 49(3), pp. 379-414 (p. 410).
- 2 How NGO's providing foreign humanitarian aid could also become a resource for war-waging militias: Jean, Francois 1996: 'Aide humanitaire et économie de guerre', in: Jean/Rufin (eds.): *Economie des guerres civiles*, pp. 543-589.
- 3 The Study Group on Causes of War in Hamburg was founded in the late 1970s and has built a data base on wars beginning with the year 1945. The group combines empirical study with theory-building and established a data base with data gathered by Istvan Kende, a Hungarian scientist (1917-1988). As work has progressed, revisions to Kende's original data have been made several times. The group consists of nearly forty graduate students and research associates and is led by Prof. Klaus Jürgen Gantzel.
- 4 The 'Hamburg Approach' has been elaborated in a series of three monographs: Siegelberg, Jens 1994: *Kapitalismus und Krieg. Eine Theorie des Krieges in der Weltgesellschaft*, Münster und Hamburg; Jung, Dietrich 1995: *Tradition – Moderne – Krieg. Grundlegung einer Methode zur Erforschung kriegsursächlicher Prozesse im Kontext globaler Vergesellschaftung*, Münster und Hamburg; Schlichte, Klaus 1996: *Krieg und Vergesellschaftung in Afrika. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Krieges*, Münster und Hamburg.
- 5 For an overview on the state of the art, cf. Vasquez, John A. 1988: 'The Steps to War: Toward a Scientific Explanation of Correlates of War Findings', *World Politics* 40(1), 108-145; Mendler, Martin/Schwegler-Rohmeis, Wolfgang 1988: *Weder Drachhentöter noch Sicherheitsingenieur – Bilanz und kritische Analyse der sozialwissenschaftlichen Kriegsursachenforschung* (HSFK Forschungsbericht), Frankfurt a.M. According to our knowledge there are currently at least five large research projects which try to register armed

conflicts over longer historical periods: COSIMO (Heidelberg), LORANOW (Boulder), COW (Ann Arbor), the group around Wallenstein (Uppsala) and the AKUF (Hamburg).

- 6 The 28 registered wars took place in the following countries: *Africa*: Algeria, Burundi, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Uganda, Zaire; *Middle East*: Afghanistan, Iraq (Kurdistan), Lebanon, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Turkey (Kurds); *Asia*: Cambodia, India (Kashmir), Myanmar (Burma), Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), Philippines (NPA and on Mindanao), Sri Lanka; *Latin America*: Columbia (FARC, ELN), Guatemala, Mexico (Chiapas, EPR) and Peru (Sendero Luminoso, MRTA), see: Rabehl, Thomas/Trines, Stefan (eds.) 1997: *Das Kriegsgeschehen 1996. Register der Kriege und bewaffneten Konflikte*, Arbeitspapier 6/1997, Research Unit of Wars, Armament and Development, University of Hamburg.
- 7 The following data are all taken from the data base of AKUF which is published in Gantzel, Klaus Jürgen/Schwinghammer, Thorsten 1995: *Die Kriege nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 1945–1992. Daten und Tendenzen*, and Gantzel, Klaus Jürgen 1997: 'War in the Post-World War II World: Some Empirical Trends and a Theoretical Approach', in: Turon, David (ed.): *War and Ethnicity. Global connections and Local Violence*, San Marino.
- 8 We are well aware how questionable the term 'Third World' is and we use it therefore only as a residual category to subordinate those regions in which capitalistic modernization was rather an imposition from outside than an internal development.
- 9 It might well be that the increasingly intensive observation has led to the growing number of registered armed conflicts and wars in the last two decades. The history of most of the peripheral societies has not yet been examined so painstakingly that one could be sure about the exact number of conflicts. Nevertheless, it is highly improbable that these corrections would reverse the general trend, i.e. a growing number of violent mass conflicts since 1945 and that they are geographically located in the Third World. Other scholars come to similar results, cf. Holsti **Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Kalevi J. 1992: 'International Theory and War in the Third World', in: Job, Brian L. (ed.): *The Insecurity Dilemma. National Security of Third World States*, Boulder and London.
- 10 Second ranking is India (16).
- 11 Cf. Rosenau, James N. 1994: 'Neue Perspektiven in der Weltpolitik: Anmerkungen zur Antiquiertheit zwischenstaatlicher Kriege', in: Krell, Gert/Müller, Harald (eds.): *Frieden und Konflikt in den internationalen Beziehungen. Festschrift für Ernst-Otto Czempel*, Frankfurt a.M./New York, pp.116-132; Mueller, John 1989: *Retreat from Doomsday*, New York.
- 12 Cf. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1988: 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* XVIII/4, pp. 615-628.

- 13 In 26 cases the end of the war is not yet classified or the war was fading out.
- 14 The Arab League (9,5 per cent), the OAS (7,1 per cent) and the OAU (4,8 per cent) were engaged in regional mediation.
- 15 Other scholars agree with these findings, see Wallensteen, Peter/Sollenberg, Margareta 1995: 'After the Cold War: Emerging Patterns of Armed Conflict 1989–1994', *Journal of Peace Research* 32(3), pp. 345-360.
- 16 Polanyi, Karl 1957: *The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Boston.
- 17 According to Dieter Senghaas the peaceful development of the western industrialized states is based on this Hexagon of Civilization, Senghaas, Dieter 1994: *Wohin driftet die Welt? Über die Zukunft friedlicher Koexistenz*, Frankfurt a.M. p. 20.
- 18 For an example of a case study based on the Hamburg Approach, see Endres, Jürgen/Jung, Dietrich 1998: 'Was legitimiert den Griff zur Gewalt? Unterschiede im Konfliktverhalten islamistischer Organisationen in Ägypten', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 39(1), pp. 91-108.
- 19 Jean, Francois/Rufin, Jean Christophe (eds.) 1996: *Economie des guerres civiles*, Paris
- 20 Cf. Schlichte, Klaus 1997: 'Das Chaos der Gewalt und die Regeln des Marktes: Zur Behinderung von Friedensprozessen durch Kriegsökonomien', in: *Jahrbuch Frieden 1997*, München, pp. 140-148 (p. 145).
- 21 Cf. Lechervy, Christian 1996: 'L'économie des guerres cambodgiennes: accumulation et dispersion', in: Jean/Rufin (eds.), 1996, pp. 189-232.
- 22 Boucaud, André/ Boucaud, Louis 1996: 'Burma: Verließ mit goldenem Boden', *Der Überblick* 3(96), pp. 35-38.
- 23 Angoustures, Aline/Pascal, Valérie 1996: 'Diasporas et financement des conflits', in: Jean/Rufin (eds.) 1996, pp. 495-542 (p. 501).
- 24 Tilly, Charles 1985: 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in: Evans, Peter/Rueschemeyer, Dietrich/Skocpol, Theda (eds.) 1985: *Bringing the State Back in*, Cambridge, p. 171.
- 25 Jean, Francois 1996, p. 567.
- 26 Waldmann, Peter 1997: 'Bürgerkrieg – Annäherungen an einen schwer faßbaren Begriff', *Leviathan* 25(4), pp. 480-500 (p. 497).
- 27 Holsti, Kalevi J. 1991: *Change in the International System. Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Relations*, Aldershot/Brookfield, p. 19.
- 28 Tilly, Charles 1990: *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 900–1900*, Cambridge, Mass.
- 29 Elias, Norbert 1989: *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation, Bd. 2, Wandlungen der Gesellschaft, Entwurf zu einer Theorie der Zivilisation*, Frankfurt a.M., p. 76.